

CHAPTER V

America and Europe—Burr's conspiracy—Disputes with Great Britain
—The second American war—Internal development.

IN 1801 the Americans had to send their navy to European waters, and a fleet from an independent nation across the Atlantic was seen in the Mediterranean for the first time. Such government as might be said to exist in Tripoli had demanded an increase in the sum which the United States paid annually for "immunity" from the Tripolitan pirates; and the increase asked for having been refused, American vessels began to suffer. A peace favourable to the Americans was not concluded until 1804, in which year President Jefferson was re-elected for a second term of office. His own abilities, combined with a number of fortunate circumstances, had made him popular throughout the country. It had been found possible, thanks largely to the tariff, to lower taxation considerably; the National Debt was reduced by \$12,000,000; the area of the country had been doubled by the acquisition of Louisiana; and large tracts of land had been taken over which had formerly belonged to the Indians. The state of Ohio had been admitted to the Union in 1802, and the territories of Michigan and Illinois had been formed out of Indiana. All the adventurous spirits of the time looked towards the west for colossal possibilities of fortune.

This great expansive movement led to another insurrection, one of the many with which the American Government had to deal from time to time in the early part of the country's independent history. Aaron Burr, the Vice-President of the United States during Jefferson's first term of office, had fought a duel with Alexander Hamilton in 1804. Hamilton fired into the air, but Burr, either deliberately or accidentally, killed his opponent. George Clifton, Governor of the State of New York, subsequently became Vice-President and Burr retired from the public view. His old friends avoided him, and he conceived a marvellous scheme of founding a new empire in the west. The project is not without its interest, for it was very nearly feasible, and if Burr had had the support of such Englishmen as those who followed Clive and Hastings the story of the Aaron Burr conspiracy might well have had a different ending.

In 1806 we find Burr in what was then the Far West—that is to say, the eastern side of the Mississippi Valley. He collected round him a numerous body of supporters; but, although a few of them were men of fairly good position and character, most of them seem to have been of little account morally or intellectually. It was Burr's design to take possession of Mexico or of the Mississippi Valley, or of both. The difference between the early settlers and the new adventurers was soon clear. Burr's friends acted like mere bandits or desperadoes; they were actuated neither by faith nor by principle. Every man sought what he could get for himself; and if a few hundred did stand by Burr they did so, it seems clear, chiefly for the purpose of throwing

the blame on him if they were caught. When the plans of the scheme became known, the United States authorities in the territory of Mississippi mobilised all their available forces, and in January 1807 Burr and his companions were taken prisoners.

The corruption of American politics was again shown. Burr, having organised this expedition within the limits of Virginia, was tried in the Virginia Courts for treason against the United States Government. The trial, however, was made a purely party question, as such trials in America have always been. The Administration tried to do Burr as much harm as possible; but the opponents of the Administration, entirely neglecting the merits of the case, took his part, and he was acquitted. Later on he was indicted for invading the Spanish territories, and again acquitted, because, as his ingenious defenders successfully pleaded, there was no proof that he intended to annex them.

The Burr and the Tripoli incidents were annoying while they lasted; but they were trifling as compared with the causes of the second war with England. The Napoleonic campaigns were still going on, and Great Britain was taking the chief part in them. A government which was fighting Napoleon on land and sea could not afford to be particularly scrupulous; but there is no doubt that in their dealings with the Americans the English were seldom tactful. The English Government had never entirely renounced the right to search; and, in spite of protests from Washington, the right was even extended so as to include American ships of war. In addition to this, the American neutral trade was treated almost as if it were contraband. Merchant vessels would be

stopped and searched, and, in some instances, ordered to sail to a different port from that to which they were bound, while in other cases American ships would not be allowed to leave English ports after having taken on a fresh cargo. The result was that thousands of pounds' worth of valuable merchandise deteriorated or became quite useless. On the other hand, there was equally little doubt that American shippers often played a double game by importing goods coming from one of the combatants and then re-exporting them as "neutral" merchandise. The American Government could do little directly to relieve the hardships of those Americans who were really suffering, and complaints to London were ineffective.

The principle on which Great Britain acted at this time was, "once a British subject, always a British subject." The American contention was that any foreigner who had gone through the prescribed forms of naturalisation, and had resided for five years in United States territory, could claim all the privileges of an American citizen. The Americans also rejected Great Britain's demand for the right of search; "free bottoms make free goods" was their argument. There were naturally divergent views on this question on both sides; but every American objected to the British system of impressment. English sailors who had no desire for glory joined American crews and passed themselves off as American subjects. In the case of a search, their companions were not slow in supporting them. It was not long before the British authorities became aware of this practice; and when they did so they showed less indulgence than ever to the American crews.

In the spring of 1806 James Monroe and William Pinckney were sent to London as a special mission with instructions to endeavour to negotiate a new treaty respecting the right of search and the other points in dispute. This mission was not even partially successful; it was a complete failure. The British Government absolutely refused to give way on the question of the right of search; and even when the American delegates expressed a wish to discuss the neutrality of their trade they received no satisfaction. After much discussion some sort of compromise was reached and a new treaty signed. Monroe and Pinckney returned to Washington in March 1807, and placed the result of their labours before President Jefferson, who, on reading the treaty, at once decided to reject it without even taking the trouble of referring the matter to the Senate.

This action provoked an outcry from both the political parties. Amidst the babel of abuse it is difficult to discover a moderate attack; but the constitutional issue is clearly established. The President had no right to make treaties or to reject them; and Jefferson was further reproached with his former speeches and writings about restraining the power of the executive. The President's friends pointed out that the envoys had not brought back a new treaty at all; they had only remodelled an old treaty, though they had to admit that in its new form the document made no provision for the rights of the American people. A few months later, on July 22nd, an incident occurred which silenced the opposition to the Government for the time, and helped to strengthen the hands of the President.

The United States frigate *Chesapeake* was stopped off Chesapeake Bay by the British frigate *Leopard*. The captain of the *Leopard* demanded permission to search the *Chesapeake* for deserters from the service of Great Britain, and Captain Barron, of the *Chesapeake*, refusing, the *Leopard* opened fire. The American vessel fired a single gun in reply—she was unable to fire more, being quite unprepared for action—and then struck her colours. The British commander took four sailors from the American warship; one of them was English, and the remaining three were Americans of English descent who had escaped after having been impressed previously.

This encounter startled the nation, but produced no such effect as would have been the case some years before. To begin with, the commercial and wealthy classes throughout the country were inclined to favour Great Britain, which they looked upon as a country that was destined to liberate the world from the yoke of the French Emperor, for the Napoleon whom Livingston had to consult about the purchase of Louisiana was a much less powerful person than the Napoleon of 1807. The United States, beyond a doubt, had been grossly insulted by the action of the captain of the *Leopard*, but the higher classes in America were inclined to resent President Jefferson's retaliatory measures as being excessive. He issued a proclamation ordering all British warships to leave American waters, and instructions were sent to the American Chargé d'Affaires in London that he was to demand suitable compensation, and to obtain from the British Government a complete renunciation of the right of search and impressment. England recognised the seriousness

of the affair by sending a special envoy to Washington to negotiate with President Jefferson and his advisers, but it was four years before an agreement was reached, and the renunciation on which Jefferson had strongly insisted was never made. However strange it may seem to us at the present day, it is none the less the fact that the affair of the *Chesapeake* became a party question, and that large numbers of people who looked upon Napoleon as a fiend and a monster took the part of Great Britain all through the crisis that ensued.

America suffered during the hostilities between England and France to a great extent. France bore her a grudge because the Americans had ceased to be her allies; England was annoyed because American ships gave refuge to the British deserters. On March 16th, 1806, England had declared all the French ports, from Brest to the Elbe, closed to American shipping as well as to all other shipping. France replied to this in November by the so-called Berlin Decree, forbidding all commerce with Great Britain. In January 1807 Great Britain countered the French reply by a decree prohibiting coasting trade between one port and another in the possession of her enemies. This was followed by a famous order in council (November 11th, 1807), forbidding all neutrals to trade either with France or her allies, except on payment of a tribute to Great Britain, each vessel to pay in proportion to its cargo. Napoleon's Milan Decree, which followed on December 17th, forbade "all trade whatsoever" with Great Britain, and declared any vessels that paid the tribute demanded by the British order in council to be lawful prizes of the French fleet.

The oversea trade of the United States at this time was very large, and most of it, as the result of the war, was now being carried in American ships. The result of these decrees was that trading became practically impossible. It was now a dangerous instead of a peaceful calling, and numerous public men in America emphasised the injury done to the country's honour by the two foremost European Powers. America, in a word, could carry on no commercial pursuit whatever without the permission of England and France, and this permission was refused.

Jefferson has been greatly blamed for his curious policy in connection with the war. He was, in so far as we can judge from his actions, a capable intriguer and a clever politician, but, on the whole, a superficial demagogue and not a statesman who could take strong measures when strong measures were necessary. In order that American shipping might be adequately protected, he conceived the childish plan of building cheap gunboats, which could never have stood up for a moment against a squadron of the British fleet. His last great scheme was to lay an embargo upon all United States vessels and upon foreign vessels with cargoes shipped in the United States ports after the passing of the Act, on December 22nd, 1807. This simply led, in practice, to an almost complete abandonment of American commerce. The farcical nature of the Act was emphasised by the innumerable protests of American merchants, and it was so greatly disliked by all the large export houses that its repeal became necessary early in 1809.

Jefferson gave way to James Madison in this year,

and the new Administration endeavoured, without much success, to induce Great Britain and France to suspend the restrictions they had put on American vessels in answer to the embargo. The plans of Jefferson and Madison, in addition to the trouble they caused to foreign countries, led to much discontent in America. They were violently opposed by the Federalists; and several legislatures and even many of the courts pronounced them to be unconstitutional and invalid. An indirect effect of the ill-feeling between the United States and the two great European countries was felt by the Indians on the north-west frontier. Since they had begun to follow the example of the white man they had abandoned many of their old predatory habits and lived largely by the sale of their furs. Napoleon's decrees prevented the export of their staple commodity for the time being, and from their consequent poverty ill-feeling naturally arose. In the spring of 1811 a Shawnee chief named Tecumseh assumed the leadership of the more important tribes, and endeavoured to incite all the Indians on the north-west frontier to support him in waging war against the United States. The result was a series of Indian raids on isolated settlements, which became so frequent that General Harrison, Governor of Indiana territory, organised a large body of troops and marched against the main army of the Indians, under the command of Tecumseh's brother, "the Prophet." The two armies met at Tippecanoe, Indiana, on November 7th, 1811, and the battle of that day was one of the most desperate ever fought between Indians and whites. The losses on both sides were very heavy.

The rising of the Indian tribes allowed all the Americans, moderates as well as extremists, to give free rein to their hatred of Great Britain. Reports were sedulously spread that the English Government was at the back of the little rebellion, and that without British assistance the Indians could not have made such progress as they had made. All the Americans who had consistently taken the part of Napoleon against England made renewed efforts to discredit the British Government in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, and in this they were encouraged by the President himself; for Madison showed an extraordinary dislike for England. Despite the fact that the French Government continued to seize American vessels, no complaints were made against it, all attention being concentrated on Great Britain. No attempt by Great Britain to conciliate the American people appeared to have any effect; and the Washington authorities, instead of maintaining an impartial attitude, definitely ranged themselves with the anti-English elements in the Union.

On April 28th, 1812, it was announced that France had abrogated her Berlin and Milan Decrees in so far as they related to American vessels, and on May 20th the American Chargé d'Affaires showed Lord Castlereagh a copy of the official notification that this had been done. Castlereagh at once offered to revoke the English orders in council in so far as American ships were affected by them, on condition that the United States also made one or two small concessions. This offer was refused; the Americans concluded a secret treaty with France, and preparations were made for an invasion of Canada. The aim of President Madison's advisers was quite clear.

Napoleon was preparing an expedition to Russia, which, in their opinion, would make France mistress of Europe and drive England into bankruptcy and ruin. Arrangements were made for stopping and capturing British trading vessels in American waters ; and on June 18th the President announced to Congress, in a speech which appeared to be deliberately ambiguous, that the two nations were in a state of war. It was not said that any formal declaration had been made, or which nation had taken the initiative.

There was a violent debate after this. The northern and eastern states demanded separation from the Union, and their representatives in Congress were eager to make known the wishes of their electors. It was openly asserted in Congress that there had been undue delay in bringing to the attention of the British Government the fact that France had annulled her Berlin and Milan Decrees, which, as it had since become known, she had done so far back as March 1811 ; and there were further complaints that the Americans were suffering more from French attacks on their shipping than from the British attacks.

War had been determined on, but for reasons very different from those set out in the Bill formally declaring it. Briefly, six main causes were assigned for hostilities. It was alleged that the British had :

(1) Impressed American citizens while sailing on the high seas, dragging them on board their ships of war, and forced them to serve against nations which were at peace with the United States, and to participate in aggressions on the rights of their fellow-citizens when met on the high seas.

(2) Violated the rights and peace of the American coasts and harbours, harassed American commerce, and wantonly spilt American blood within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

(3) Plundered American commerce on every sea under the pretended blockades, not of harbours or ports, but of extended coasts.

(4) Committed innumerable spoliations on American ships and commerce under the authority of various orders in council.

(5) Employed secret agents within the United States with a view to subverting the Government.

(6) Encouraged Indian tribes to make war on the people of the United States.

If a government wishes to make war, reasons which are technically adequate can always be given. So far as these half-dozen justifications are concerned, it may be said that no proof of the last two was ever brought forward; and the first four complaints refer to incidents which could not be avoided in any struggle such as that which Great Britain was carrying on at the time. If we wish to ascertain the real causes of the war of 1812, we shall find them in the ambitions of rising political leaders like Henry Clay, who is known to posterity chiefly by the inexpensive cigar named after him, and John C. Calhoun. These two men, and a few others of not quite so much political importance, exercised considerable influence on the President, on James Monroe, the Secretary of State, on Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, and many other important officials.

It was clear to all these men that Canada was in a practically defenceless condition. There were very few British troops across the border; there was too

much work for them to do elsewhere. It seemed an opportune moment for invasion and for adding a vast and rich province to the American possessions. This point of view was carefully explained; and the indignities visited on American seamen were used to excite the resentment of the people and to provide a good excuse for a campaign against Great Britain. The Federalist members of Congress, who had at last realised what the scheme was, protested vigorously, and the Bill declaring war was passed by small majorities. In the House of Representatives it had a majority of 30 out of 128 votes, and in the Senate it was passed by a majority of 6.

The protests raised in Congress were echoed in the country; and riots took place at Boston, Baltimore, and other large places. The lower classes, always easily aroused and always "patriotic," wrecked newspapers and the houses of families which were thought to be supporting the opposition to the war. In addition to the antagonism of the New Englanders, who disliked the war on ethical grounds, the Government had to reckon with the merchants affected by it. It was a struggle at first between the immediate commercial interests of some and the far-sighted cupidity of others. Madison, to do him justice, acted very skilfully when he had considered what was taking place in Europe, and what would have to be done against the British in Canada. So early as the spring of 1811, nearly a year before the declaration of war, he had assembled 10,000 men at Boston in readiness for the expedition; and several months before his statement in Congress 50,000 volunteers had been summoned to the colours. In reply to the protests of the British envoy, the Presi-

dent gave every assurance that nothing was dearer to his heart than a long continuance of the amicable relations then prevailing between the two countries. Bismarck's capacity for judicious deceit, however, is not always accompanied with a similar capacity for foretelling events.

When war was announced (June 19th, 1812), the American force, under General Hull, hurried over the Canadian border without giving the British time to prepare for them; but a vigorous counter-attack by General Brock led to the fall of the American port of Michilimachiac on July 17th. The Indians in the district, who disliked the Americans intensely, immediately rose in revolt, and the Americans suffered several minor defeats before they were completely routed at Queenstown on October 18th. At sea they were more fortunate; and the accounts of the capture of small British vessels by large American warships, with details omitted, read almost like the description of a miracle, even to the sceptical planters of the south. In spite of many defects, the British blockading squadrons managed to obstruct American commerce so completely that the merchants soon began to complain strongly to President Madison.

The Government was not in an altogether safe position. Most of the regular soldiers had been concentrated on the Canadian border, and there was a considerable difference of opinion over the calling out of the militia. Armies on a large scale were not liked in the United States a century ago any more than they are to-day; and many of the state legislatures, taking their stand on a clause in the Constitution, refused to enroll the militiamen under their charge. The Constitution authorised Congress "to

provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." It was questioned whether the formal declaration of war could be called a "law" of the Union; and the attack on Canada was clearly neither an insurrection nor an invasion. It would have gone hard with the United States if England's attention had not been fixed on the campaign with Napoleon: had there been time to spare for minor matters, advantage would undoubtedly have been taken of the arrogant weakness of the United States.

The Americans were able to take the offensive in the autumn of 1813; and in an action on the banks of the Thames, not far from Detroit, the British, under General Proctor, were defeated by the Americans under General Harrison. The Indian chief, Tecumseh, was among the killed. His skin was cut up by the infuriated American soldiers into razor strops, which were presented to the more important members of Congress, including Henry Clay. After this the campaign took an unfavourable turn for the Americans. Parties of British troops, greatly inferior in numbers as a rule to their opponents, crossed the frontier at different places, and by the end of the year the New England armies had been hurled back as far as Buffalo.

In 1814 the British won a series of important victories; but chiefly owing to the stupidity of General Sir George Prevost the advantages they had gained were lost in the naval and land action of Lake Champlain, on September 11th. In this battle the British fleet was defeated by a smaller number of American ships under the command of one of the most skilful seamen of the time, Captain McDonough.

This was one of many striking victories made by the American ships; but with the French vanquished in Europe, and Napoleon out of the way at Elba, a few squadrons of British warships were able to make for American waters. By the autumn of 1814 not a single American warship was to be found on the high seas. Those which had not been wrecked, or sunk, were blockaded in port by the British fleet. Advantage was taken of the blockades to land troops and ravage the country, and, in August, a strong British force marched to Washington, sacked the town, and set the buildings on fire.

The American Government was at this time in its usual hopeless plight—it is a remarkable fact that during the revolution, as well as during the war of 1812–14, the Government was so weakened by dissensions among its members that it could give no adequate lead to the country. There were innumerable generals and minor officials; but it was very nearly impossible to obtain men; and, even when the war was well advanced, wrangles over the calling up of the militia were still proceeding in the various states.

In the state elections of 1812–13, the Federalists secured control of the Government of Massachusetts, and a series of violent speeches in the Legislature testified to the extraordinary bitterness with which the war was regarded in the New England States. When a congratulatory address, on the occasion of an American victory, was proposed, Josiah Quincy moved that, "In a war like the present, waged without justifiable cause, and prosecuted in a manner which indicates that conquest and ambition are its real motives, it is not becoming to a moral

and religious people to express any approbation of military or naval exploits which are not immediately connected with the defence of our sea-coast and soil." This was passed; a demand for separation arose; and with the English victories of 1814 the secession movement in the New England States became very strong. On October 16th Massachusetts voted a million dollars for the establishment of a state army of 10,000 men, and followed this up by asking the other New England States to assemble in convention at Hartford with the object of discussing the advisability of secession.

The financial question was again a serious one, and the Government resorted to the most desperate expedients for raising money. To meet the interest on the loans which had been contracted, taxes were imposed upon paper, furniture, carriages, and even watches. The charter of the first national bank having expired, the bank automatically closed its doors, and the Government had not money enough to establish another. It was calculated that the expenditure for 1815 would amount to £10,000,000, and that the national income for the same financial year would not amount to more than £2,200,000. Many of the banks suspended payment, and the opposition to the Government's policy gathered strength. In order that Great Britain might be cut off from the advantages of commerce with the United States, a new embargo had been laid on trade, to take effect from the beginning of 1814; but this bore so hardly on the Massachusetts fisheries that the state Legislature dubbed it "another Boston Port Bill," and declared it to be unconstitutional. The Act authorising the embargo was shortly after-

wards repealed by the Government—another instance of the part dominating the whole and of the state proving to be more powerful than the central authority.

Dismayed at the developments of the last few months, and realising at last that all hopes of the United States absorbing Canada were vain, Madison approached the Emperor Alexander of Russia and besought him to intercede with England. The request was granted; but Great Britain, while expressing willingness to discuss peace with the American envoys, declined to consider the Russian intervention. Envoys were accordingly despatched, and a very indefinite treaty, though still a treaty of peace, was signed at Ghent on December 24th, 1814. Very few of the most important questions in dispute were settled in it; for Great Britain insisted on retaining some of the captured territory in the north. These matters were left for the further consideration of commissioners. The United States, however, had her way in one important matter. Certain Irishmen, captured on American warships by the British, were ordered to be tried for treason, and were not in consequence treated as ordinary prisoners of war. The United States, holding that it was her duty to protect all foreigners from the English, insisted that the captured Irish prisoners were simply foreigners who had become American citizens, and after much argument this principle was at last admitted by the British Government.

The Hartford Convention met late in December, and after a session of three weeks adjourned on January 14th, 1815. The report published by the delegates recommended that states "which had no

common umpire" should "be their own judges and execute their own decisions"—an unkind way of referring to the weakness of the Washington Government. Their most important work, perhaps, was the list of amendments to the Constitution which they drew up, providing for the protection of the weaker states against the stronger; and for the protection likewise of a minority of states against any aggressions attempted by the majority. Although no open threat was made, it was clear from the wording of the document that a refusal of the demands contained in it meant secession; for if, as was proposed, each state should be allowed to retain and administer the customs dues collected within its jurisdiction, the financial power of the central authority would be no more. When the delegates presented these demands to Congress, however, they were informed that it was no longer necessary to make them, as peace had been declared. A period of peace seemed to be arriving, for the settlement of Ghent had been followed by an amicable arrangement with the Indian tribes on the north-west frontier, and with a foe who was more inconvenient than dangerous—the Dey of Algiers.

It may seem contradictory to say, in the face of threats of secession, that the revolution and the war of 1813-14 made the Americans a united nation. This is true, nevertheless, so far as foreign affairs are concerned, in spite of internal disputes and other indications to the contrary. The Federalists, for example, who had opposed the war from the beginning, steadily lost popularity once the campaign was at an end; and it was recognised by all parties that the individual states, whether for good or evil, must

act together in foreign affairs however much they might differ over disputes at home. This became known gradually, as the political acumen of the people developed; a more immediate cause for concern was the financial condition of the country. There were, as usual, numerous speculators, as there had been at the time of the revolution, who took full advantage of their country's difficulties to make fortunes for themselves; but there were very many cases of ruined finances and loss of property, and the national exchequer was exhausted. The public debt had increased by £24,000,000, and Madison, who had been re-elected President in the course of the first year of the war, with Elbridge Gerry as Vice-President, almost broke down under his responsibilities. Instead of the United States having conquered Canada, Canada had very nearly conquered the United States—no small blow to such national pride as existed south of the Great Lakes—and trade suffered terribly.

Expressed in other words, the results of the war were entirely ineffective. After more than two years of hard fighting, American commerce was reduced to very trifling dimensions; credit there was none; and not a square mile of territory had been added to the possessions of the United States. The material losses, even if they were forgotten in the course of a few years, were positive, though it should be added that, in proportion to the population and the wealth of the country, neither the losses in men nor the losses in money could be considered as particularly high. The national debt was not large, but the burdens of taxation were not equally divided. The cost of living was high, naturally: groceries and all kinds of pig-iron were particularly dear. On the

other hand, only extremely low prices could be obtained for staple commodities such as tobacco, wheat, and cotton. *Lines' Register* (Vol. V.) gives a valuable table showing the prices current in the large cities at this period. Land transport was almost impossible—so poor was it, indeed, that a barrel of flour which was worth 18s. in Richmond, Virginia, cost 47s. by the time it reached Boston. The coasting trade was suspended; and the export trade, of course, fell to minute proportions. In 1811, for instance, the value of the goods exported amounted to £9,000,000. In 1813 this figure had dropped to £5,000,000, and in 1814 to a little over £1,000,000. When the war ended, there was a great change; and if the export trade did not improve for a year or two, the country itself felt the difference almost at once.

James Monroe, whose opinions had become more moderate as he grew older, was elected President in 1817, with Daniel D. Tompkins as Vice-President; and he held office until 1825. At the beginning of his Administration armed intervention was necessary in Georgia and Florida, chiefly on account of raids and massacres by the Creek Indians. The Seminole war or the Florida war, as it was variously called, was conducted on the American side by General Andrew Jackson, who had become famous not long before for his gallant defence of New Orleans against the British. The Government, in November 1817, determined to clear the country of the hostile tribes, and the little campaign ended in the following March. While the operations were being carried on, Jackson entered Florida, which had for a long time been used as a shelter by fugitive slaves, criminals,

smugglers, pirates, and bad characters of all descriptions. St. Mark's and Pensacola were captured by the American troops, and two British subjects, accused of inciting the Indians to rebel, were put to death. All this brought a strong protest from the Spanish Government, and an earlier offer to buy Florida was renewed by Washington in 1818, by which year the finances of the United States had begun to improve. The purchase price of £1,000,000 was soon agreed upon, and a formal treaty was signed on February 22nd, 1819, by which Spain agreed to hand over the state of West Florida to the United States. Florida was officially recognised as United States territory in 1821.

Indiana was admitted as a state on December 11th, 1816, Mississippi on December 10th, 1817, Illinois on December 3rd, 1818, and Alabama on December 4th, 1819. Before the admission of Alabama it was proposed that Missouri should also join the Union; but Missouri was a slave-holding territory, and this fact was referred to in Congress when the motion was brought forward. One of the representatives for New York, James Tallmadge, moved that no more slaves should be brought into the Union, and that the children of those slaves already forming part of the population should be liberated at the age of twenty-five. This resolution was rejected, whereupon another New York representative, John W. Taylor, moved that slavery should be entirely prohibited north of latitude $36^{\circ} 30'$. This motion was also lost; but in view of the evident unwillingness of the House of Representatives to admit slaves, the original proposal for the admission of Missouri was not pressed. A portion of this

territory, however, just to the south of the latitude recommended, was set aside and called Arkansas. The latitude in question would have left practically all North Carolina, Tennessee, and the Indian territory within the slave-holding area.

The distinction between north and south became clearer during these debates. The north held that too much indulgence had been shown to the slave owners. The organisation of the territory to the south of Ohio, the organisation of the Mississippi territory, and the purchase of Louisiana were all national events, said the representatives of the north, which extended or at least acknowledged the area of slavery. Of the eight states admitted since the drawing up of the Constitution, on the other hand, four had been free states and four slave states. It was now, therefore, the turn of a free state to be admitted, Alabama, the last, having been a slave state. The southern representatives held that it was against the letter and spirit of the Constitution for any compulsion to be laid on a state as to whether it should continue to approve of slavery or not; for this was a matter in which the supreme authority was left to the states themselves. The constitutional answer to this argument was that Missouri was not as yet a state at all, but a territory, and in consequence subject to the control of Congress; and that even if it had been a state it would not have been one of the original thirteen, to which alone belonged the powers reserved to them by the Constitution. It was further argued that slavery was against the interests of the nation, and that, such being the case, Congress was justified in trying to put a stop to it.

The quarrel over the Missouri slaves spread from Congress to the state legislatures, and from one political faction to another; but when both sides had considered and realised their position, the United States was definitely divided into two portions. In the north the people almost unanimously followed the lead of the men who had spoken in Congress in behalf of New York, demanding the restriction of slavery in those states where it was already permitted, as well as calling upon Washington to refuse to admit Missouri until slavery had been abolished. The south maintained that the north was interfering unjustly; and the legal arguments of both sides were soon heard no longer amid the din of controversy and abuse.

The year 1819 was coming to an end when Congress reassembled. One of its first acts was to discuss a proposal for admitting Maine to the Union, Massachusetts having consented to the division owing to the difficulty of properly administering such a large tract of territory. Maine being a "free" state, the advocates of slavery held that Missouri, a slave state, should be received at the same time. The northerners would not yield. "Not on numbers but on principles," they said, "have we taken our stand." The warmth of feeling increased, and at length the famous Missouri compromise was proposed by Senator J. B. Thomas, of Illinois. A Bill was passed in the Senate admitting Missouri and Maine to the Union without any restriction upon slavery; but a clause introduced by Senator Thomas prohibited the introduction of slavery "into any part of Louisiana territory as yet unorganised." This left Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri with per-

mission to continue their slave-holding if they desired, but it prevented the extension of the principle. The House of Representatives objected to this compromise, and after both Houses had met in committee, it was decided that Missouri should be received free of restrictions, but that slavery should be prohibited north of latitude $36^{\circ} 30'$. Maine and Missouri thus joined the Union at the same time (March 3rd, 1820).

A difference of opinion at once arose as to the meaning of the compromise. Strictly speaking, slavery in the region marked off was prohibited for ever. At a meeting of the Cabinet, however, John Quincy Adams suggested to President Monroe that the spirit of the compromise meant that slavery was prohibited only in the territories and not in any states that might be admitted from within the prescribed boundaries. Forty years later more was to be heard of this difference of opinion, which characterised the compromise from the very beginning. There were further difficulties. Missouri adopted a constitution denying even the free negroes the rights of citizens. This fact was brought to the notice of Congress in the autumn of 1820, when the time came for the Constitution of Missouri to be formally approved. The southern party urged that the formality should be completed at once and the state admitted; the northern party thought that the whole transaction should be repudiated. Henry Clay, who was found on this occasion among the moderates, succeeded in inducing the southerners to support a resolution providing for the formal admission of Missouri as soon as she should "covenant the rights of citizenship to the citizens of either of the states." Missouri agreed to this; and after so many



TYPE OF MOQUI (PRON. MOKE) INDIAN (N. E. ARIZONA).

delays, objections, arguments, and counter-arguments, the Constitution was formally approved in August. This was the first really important slavery debate in the United States, and it stands out among the events of the earlier part of the nineteenth century as the essential preliminary to the bitter struggle of the sixties.

After all this excitement the story of the next few years is humdrum but for one very important Presidential announcement—the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine. This is a principle of American politics which is dealt with later in this volume; in the meantime it is sufficient to note that it was promulgated on December 22nd, 1823.

John Quincy Adams, the son of the second President, was elected to succeed Monroe in 1825; and once again the old quarrel of the relationship between the National Government and the State Government had to be fought out. Several years previously, Georgia had ceded the western portion of the state, including Alabama and Mississippi, in return for a promise that the Washington Government would deal with the claims of the Indians to the territory of Georgia itself. The Creeks at this time held 25,000,000 acres, 15,000,000 acres of which were bought by the United States Government and transferred to Georgia. Of the remaining 10,000,000 acres, half was allocated to the Creeks and half to the Cherokees; and in 1825 a treaty was entered into with the Creeks by which the United States was declared to be the owner of all the Creek territory within the limits of Georgia and Alabama. This treaty, which was disliked by many of the important chiefs, led to an Indian rising, and in

April 1826 the Government arranged a compromise which satisfied neither the state of Georgia nor the Indians. Governor Troup, of Georgia, accused the Administration of acting unconstitutionally, ascribing the Government's action to "anti-slavery" motives and calling upon the neighbouring states to "stand by their arms" if they wanted to preserve their rights. After this he sent a party of surveyors into Indian territory—an action which angered both Congress and President.



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