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dc.creatorVilla, Edgar
dc.creatorSalazar, Andrés
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-03T17:44:40Z
dc.date.available2019-07-03T17:44:40Z
dc.date.created2013
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/74375
dc.descriptionThis paper explores theoretical linkages between poverty traps, economic inequalityand delinquency in a perfect competition overlapping generations model characterizedby dual legal production sectors and one illegal sector. The model positsan absence of credit for human capital accumulation, which generates barriers toskilled educational attainment. We find that the existence of a poverty trap underconditions of sufficient initial economic inequality and costly indivisible humancapital investment generates persistent delinquency in the long run. We examinesteady state changes caused by shocks that increase skilled wages or reduceland assets available to the unskilled, finding that these shocks produce outbursts of delinquency that die out later if the shocks are temporary but increases permanentlyotherwise. We also find that an increase on relative poverty has anambiguous effect on long run delinquency rates while an increased focus on lawenforcement policies, intended to increase deterrence and incapacitation, reducesdelinquency in the long run and increases wealth inequality.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.publisherFacultad de Ciencias Economicas - Universidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.relationhttp://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/ceconomia/article/view/42497
dc.relation.ispartofUniversidad Nacional de Colombia Revistas electrónicas UN Cuadernos de Economía
dc.relation.ispartofCuadernos de Economía
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCuadernos de Economía; Vol. 32, núm. 61 (2013): Edición especial: Inequality, Polarization and Social Conflict; 769-801 2248-4337 0121-4772
dc.subjectpoverty traps
dc.subjectinequality
dc.subjectdelinquency
dc.subjecthuman capital.
dc.subjectI30
dc.subjectJ31
dc.subjectK42
dc.subjectO11
dc.subjectO17
dc.titlePoverty traps, economic inequality and delinquent incentives
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.spaArtículo - Article
dc.type.hasversioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationVilla, Edgar and Salazar, Andrés (2013) Poverty traps, economic inequality and delinquent incentives. Cuadernos de Economía; Vol. 32, núm. 61 (2013): Edición especial: Inequality, Polarization and Social Conflict; 769-801 2248-4337 0121-4772 .
dc.identifier.eprintshttp://bdigital.unal.edu.co/38852/


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