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dc.rights.licenseAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional
dc.contributor.advisorCussins, Adrian
dc.contributor.authorPinzón Duarte, John Anderson
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-06T14:15:07Z
dc.date.available2020-03-06T14:15:07Z
dc.date.issued2019-12-11
dc.identifier.citationPinzón Duarte, John Anderson "Atención conjunta mediada" Disertación doctoral, Universidad Nacioanl de Colombia, 2019
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/75919
dc.description.abstractEn esta disertación sugiero una respuesta a la pregunta ‘¿Qué es la atención conjunta?’. La respuesta re-quiere de la articulación de dos elementos: (i) una caracterización de qué tipo de fenómeno estamos ha-blando y (ii) una explicación adecuada de dicho fenómeno. Respecto a (i) argumento que una correcta caracterización de este fenómeno implica afirmar que la atención conjunta es un episodio de interacción social en el que se resuelve tareas cooperativamente mediante la comunicación, cuya cooperación es depen-diente de lo que se conoce como apertura perceptual. A propósito de (ii) recojo los argumentos que sostienen la idea según la cual un episodio de atención conjunta se explica a partir de un entendimien-to/conocimiento fundamentalmente perceptual, compartido y no-proposicional. Una manera adecuada de articular (i) y (ii) consiste en ofrecer una especificación de dicho entendimiento/conocimiento y una des-cripción de cómo éste puede dar cuenta de dos rasgos esenciales de la atención conjunta: la cooperación y la apertura perceptual. De acuerdo con (ii), sólo una teoría de la percepción puede ofrecer los recursos teórico-conceptuales para esta tarea. Únicamente dos aproximaciones teóricas acerca de la percepción han ofrecido una respuesta a la pregunta por la atención conjunta: el ‘enfoque relacional de la experiencia’ y el ‘enactivismo autopoietico’. Con el objetivo de formular mi propia respuesta, rechazaré el ‘enfoque relacional’ y modificaré el ‘enactivismo autopoietico’. En contra del ‘enfoque relacional de la experiencia’ argumentaré que los recursos teórico-conceptuales de este enfoque son inadecuados para dar cuenta de la atención conjunta en cuanto que son insuficientes para establecer una diferencia metafísica entre episodios de atención conjunta y episodios de atención individual paralela. Un camino para superar esta dificultad consiste en afirmar —junto con el ‘enactivismo autopoietico’— que la interacción social es parte constitutiva de la percepción que soporta a los episodios de atención conjunta pero no de los episodios de atención individual paralela. Aunque la idea me parece esencialmente correcta, en contra del ‘enactivismo autopoietico’ argüiré que sus recursos teóri-co-conceptuales son inadecuados porque son insuficientes para dar cuenta de la cooperación y la apertura perceptual involucrada en la atención conjunta. El ‘enactivismo autopoietico’ implica que la interacción social que constituye la percepción es un fenómeno autónomo. Sin embargo, argumentaré que la coopera-ción y la apertura perceptual requieren un grado de heteronomía en su interacción social. Mi sugerencia será afirmar que una explicación adecuada de la atención conjunta implica que la percepción está constituida por un tipo de interacción social parcialmente autónomo y parcialmente heterónomo: el rasgo autónomo da cuenta del carácter social de la atención conjunta y el rasgo heterónomo da cuenta de su cooperación y apertura perceptual. Finalmente, diré que la forma que toma esta sugerencia explicativa consiste en la idea según la cual la per-cepción que ayuda a explicar la atención conjunta tiene la estructura de un turno conversacional: esto es, es un episodio cooperativo estructurado en términos de toma-de-turnos donde cada sujeto individual contribuye a sedimentar (o ‘hacer público’) cuáles aspectos del ambiente hacen parte de una tarea. La estructura con-versacional de la percepción implica que (a) la percepción está orientada por la sensibilidad a propiedades disposicionales del ambiente material: affordances-afectivos que sirven como medio para resolver tareas, e implica (b) un entendimiento/conocimiento perceptual respecto de los aspectos ambientales sedimentados conversacionalmente. Si (a) y (b) se cumplen, entonces se obtiene un entendimiento/conocimiento adecua-do para dar cuenta de la cooperación y la apertura perceptual de la atención conjunta. Cualquier episodio de atención conjunta que dependa de la estructura conversacional de la percepción será un episodio de atención conjunta mediada. Y, según yo argumento, debido a que una explicación adecuada de la atención conjunta implica las afirmaciones (a) y (b), entonces la atención conjunta correctamente expli-cada es atención conjunta mediada. Así, mi sugerencia explicativa será que la atención conjunta correcta-mente explicada es ‘atención conjunta mediada’.
dc.description.abstractIn this dissertation, I propose an answer to the question "What is joint attention?" based on the articulation of: (i) a characterization of what kind of phenomenon we are talking about and (ii) an adequate explanation of such phenomenon. Regarding (i), I claim that an accurate characterization of this phenomenon implies that joint attention is a social interaction bout in which, at least, two sub-jects are cooperatively solving a task through communication, and whose cooperation depends on what is called perceptual openness. With respect to (ii), I rely on the arguments that support the idea ac-cording to which a joint attention bout is explained by fundamentally perceptual, shared and non-propositional understanding/knowledge. I argue that a correct way of articulating (i) and (ii) is to offer both, a specification of such understanding/knowledge and a description of how such under-standing/knowledge can account for two essential features of joint attention: cooperation and per-ceptual openness. According to (ii), only a theory of perception can offer the theoretical-conceptual frame needed for this task. Only two theoretical approaches to perception have attempted to offer an answer to the question about joint attention: the ‘relational view of experience’ and ‘autopoietic enactivism’. In order to frame my own answer, I reject the ‘relational view’ and modify the ‘autopoietic enactivism’. Against the ‘relational view of experience’, I argue that its theoretical-conceptual resources are inadequate to account for joint attention in so far they fail to establish a metaphysical distinction between joint attentional and parallel individual attentional bouts. One way to overcome this difficulty is to hold —along with ‘autopoietic enactivism’—that social interaction is a constitutive part of the perception that supports joint attentional bouts but not the individual parallel ones. Although this idea seems to me exactly correct, I do not side with ‘autopoietic enactivism’, for its theoretical-conceptual resources are insufficient to account for the cooperation and perceptual openness involved in joint attention. ‘Au-topoietic enactivism’ entails that the social interaction that constitutes perception is an autonomous phenomenon. But, I argue, cooperation and perceptual openness requires a degree of heteronomy in their social interaction. My suggestion is that to state that a correct explanation of joint attention en-tails that a form of perception that is constituted by a type of partly autonomous, partly heterono-mous social interaction: the autonomous side of the social interaction accounts for its social charac-ter and the heteronomous side accounts for its cooperation and perceptual openness. Finally, I claim that the general form of my suggestion consists in the idea that perception that sup-ports joint attention has a “conversational-turn” structure: that is, a cooperative turn-taking structured bout where each individual contributes to grounding or ‘make public’ certain aspects of the environ-ment as part of a task. The conversational structure of perception implies two things: (a) perception is oriented by the sensitivity to dispositional properties of the material environment: an affective-affordances structure that behave as means to solve tasks, and (b) a perceptual understand-ing/knowledge concerning conversationally grounded environmental aspects. If (a) and (b) are both settled, then an adequate understanding/knowledge is obtained which sufficiently accounts for the cooperation and perceptual openness of joint attention. I hold that any joint attentional bout that depends on the conversational structure of perception will be an episode of joint mediated attention. And because an adequate explanation of joint attention in-volves statements (a) and (b), then a correct version of joint attention is joint mediated attention. So, my proposal in this dissertation will be: Joint attention adequately explained is ‘joint mediated attention’.
dc.format.extent319
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.rightsDerechos reservados - Universidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject.ddcFilosofía y Psicología
dc.subject.ddcPsicología::Psicología diferencial y del desarrollo
dc.titleAtención conjunta mediada: un ensayo sobre el entendimiento involucrado en la cooperación dependiente de la percepción
dc.typeOtro
dc.rights.spaAcceso abierto
dc.description.additionalDoctor en Filosofía. Línea de Investigación: Filosofía de la Mente y Filosofía del Lenguaje.
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/other
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.contributor.researchgroupFilosofía y Cognición
dc.description.degreelevelDoctorado
dc.publisher.departmentDepartamento de Filosofía
dc.publisher.branchUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá
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dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject.proposalJoint Attention
dc.subject.proposalAtención conjunta
dc.subject.proposalApertura perceptual
dc.subject.proposalshared perceptual knowledge
dc.subject.proposalAffordances-afectivos
dc.subject.proposalPerceptual overtness
dc.subject.proposalSocial interaction
dc.subject.proposalPercepción compartida
dc.subject.proposalConocimiento perceptual compartido
dc.subject.proposalShared perception
dc.subject.proposalPercepción mediada
dc.subject.proposalAffect-affordances
dc.subject.proposalShared perceptual knowledge
dc.subject.proposalInteracción social
dc.subject.proposalMediated perception
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dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
dc.type.contentText
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