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dc.rights.licenseAtribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
dc.contributor.advisorPecha Castiblanco, Arsenio
dc.contributor.authorLesmes Vega, Juan Camilo
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-05T14:04:07Z
dc.date.available2020-03-05T14:04:07Z
dc.date.issued2019-07-18
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/75864
dc.description.abstractEste documento busca extender el análisis hecho en modelos de diferenciación horizontal dinámicos, en particular los derivados del trabajo de Hotelling. Para esto, se hace una revisión de los modelos estáticos que dieron origen a la teoría, se analizan posteriormente las herramientas necesarias para llevar el análisis al escenario dinámico y se exponen los modelos dinámicos de diferenciación horizontal en los cuales se enfoca el trabajo. Finalmente, se realizan dos extensiones, en las que se amplía el número de agentes y se modifica la estructura de costos de las firmas.
dc.description.abstractThis document seeks to extend the analisys made on dynamic horizontal differentiation models, in particular those derivated from Hotelling's work. In order to do so, a review of the static models that gave rise to the theory is made, the tools required to take the analysis to the dynamic scenario are subsequently analyzed and the dynamic horizontal differentiation models in wich this work is focused on are exposed. Finally, two extentions are made, in wich the number of agents is extended and the costs structure of the firms is modified.
dc.format.extent46
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.rightsDerechos reservados - Universidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.subject.ddcMatemáticas
dc.titleAcerca de la distribución comercial en una zona geográfica: Desde Hotelling hasta juegos diferenciales.
dc.typeOtro
dc.rights.spaAcceso abierto
dc.description.additionalMagíster en Ciencias - Matemática Aplicada.
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/other
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.description.degreelevelMaestría
dc.publisher.departmentDepartamento de Matemáticas
dc.publisher.branchUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá
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dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject.proposalCompetencia monopolistica
dc.subject.proposalMonopolistic competition
dc.subject.proposalDiferenciacion horizontal
dc.subject.proposalHorizontal differentiation
dc.subject.proposalSubgame-perfect Nash’s equilibria
dc.subject.proposalEquilibrio de Nash perfecto en subjuegos
dc.subject.proposalOptimal control
dc.subject.proposalControl óptimo
dc.subject.proposalSistemas dinámicos
dc.subject.proposalDynamic systems
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