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dc.rights.licenseAtribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
dc.contributor.advisorMantilla, César
dc.contributor.advisorBogliacino, Francesco
dc.contributor.authorNiño Eslava, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-26T15:31:40Z
dc.date.available2021-02-26T15:31:40Z
dc.date.issued2021-02-02
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/79315
dc.description.abstractLa relación entre desigualdad y presión ambiental ha sido abordada desde dos mecanismos: consumo de los hogares y elección de políticas ambientales. La presente tesis se propone contribuir a la literatura abordando el estudio de la desigualdad política en conjunto con la desigualdad económica y sus efectos sobre las decisiones socio-ambientales. Se propone un experimento de laboratorio en el que los participantes deben tomar decisiones sobre cuánto extraer de un bien público y decisiones en las cuales deben escoger de manera colectiva una cuota máxima de extracción. Se introducen tratamientos con desigualdad en el poder político, al variar la influencia de los participantes en que resulte elegida su preferencia de cuota máxima. Se estudian los casos en los que el poder político este asociado a los ricos, a los pobres y a los de ingreso medio. De acuerdo a los resultados de los pilotos, se encuentra un efecto negativo sobre las preferencias de políticas ambientales solo en el caso en el que el poder político esté asociado a los ricos. Además, se identifica que quien posee el poder político aumenta sus decisiones de extracción.
dc.description.abstractThere are two mechanismsto study the relationship between inequality and environmental damage: household consumption and the choice of environmental policies. This thesis intends to contribute to the literature addressing the study of the effects of political inequality in conjunction with economic inequality. A laboratory experiment is proposed in which participants must make decisions about how much to extract from a public good and decisions in which they must collectively choose a binding extraction level. We introduced treatments with political inequality. These treatments vary the influence of the participants for choosing their binding extraction level preferred. We are interested in the cases in which political power is associated with the rich, the poor, and the middle class. According to the results of the pilots, a negative effect on environmental policy preferences is found only in the case in which political power is associated with the rich. Besides, it is identified that whoever possesses political power increases their extraction decisions.
dc.format.extent1 recurso en línea (113 páginas)
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.rightsDerechos reservados - Universidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.subject.ddc330 - Economía::333 - Economía de la tierra y de la energía
dc.titleDeterioro ambiental: entre las desigualdades económicas y políticas. Un enfoque experimental
dc.typeOtro
dc.rights.spaAcceso abierto
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/other
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.publisher.programBogotá - Ciencias Económicas - Maestría en Ciencias Económicas
dc.description.degreelevelMaestría
dc.publisher.departmentEscuela de Economía
dc.publisher.branchUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá
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dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject.proposalPolitical inequality
dc.subject.proposalDesigualdad económica
dc.subject.proposalEconomic inequality
dc.subject.proposalDesigualdad política
dc.subject.proposalMedio ambiente
dc.subject.proposalEnvironment
dc.subject.proposalExperiment
dc.subject.proposalExperimento
dc.subject.proposalBienes públicos
dc.subject.proposalPublic goods
dc.subject.proposalVotación
dc.subject.proposalInstitutional choice
dc.subject.proposalElección institucional
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
dc.type.contentText
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Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 InternacionalEsta obra está bajo licencia internacional Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial 4.0.Este documento ha sido depositado por parte de el(los) autor(es) bajo la siguiente constancia de depósito