Análisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombia

dc.contributor.advisorHerrera Saavedra, Juan Pablo
dc.contributor.authorRubiano Álvarez, Diana Paola
dc.date.accessioned2024-02-05T20:49:22Z
dc.date.available2024-02-05T20:49:22Z
dc.date.issued2023-08
dc.descriptionilustraciones, diagramasspa
dc.description.abstractLa investigación presenta un análisis económico de la ley de competencia en Colombia. Para ello, en primer lugar, y con fin de definir el panorama regional y cómo se ubica la ley de competencia colombiana a nivel latinoamericano, se desarrolló el índice propuesto por Bradford y Chilton (2018) con el fin de actualizar los datos, dadas las múltiples reformas realizadas en la región a las leyes de competencia en la última década, para así, determinar la adopción de las mejores prácticas antimonopolio reconocidas internacionalmente. En segundo lugar, se presenta una caracterización de los carteles que han sido sancionados en Colombia por la realización de acuerdos restrictivos de la competencia, y que han sido sancionados por la Ley 1340 de 2009 actualmente vigente, identificando el mercado afectado, su dimensión, el número de agentes de mercado participantes, etc., el cual nos permitirá contar con un panorama fáctico para plantear una mejor política de competencia en el país. Finalmente, se analiza el modelo de competencia perfecta, de monopolio y un modelo mixto, donde participan empresas que compiten y empresas que coluden, con el fin de analizar el precio del producto y las cantidades producidas en cada escenario. (Texto tomado de la fuente)spa
dc.description.abstractThe research presents an economic analysis of competition law in Colombia. First of all to define the regional landscape and how Colombian competition law is located within the Latin American context, the index proposed by Bradford and Chilton (2018) was developed to track the various competition law reforms carried out in the region over the last decade, in order to determine the best, internationally recognized antitrust practices to adopt. Secondly, a characterization assessment of the cartels was carried out on the result of restricting competition agreements, which have been sanctioned in Colombia by Law 1340 in 2009 and is currently still in force, identifying the affected market, its size, the number of participating market agents, etc. This will allow us to have a factual overview in order to propose a better competition policy in the Country. Finally, the perfect competition model, monopoly and a mixed model are analyzed, where competing companies and colluding companies participate, in order to analyze the price of the product and the quantities produced in each scenarioeng
dc.description.degreelevelMaestríaspa
dc.description.researchareaTeoría y política económicaspa
dc.description.researchareaTeoría y política económicaspa
dc.format.extent73 páginasspa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.identifier.instnameUniversidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.identifier.reponameRepositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.identifier.repourlhttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/spa
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/85627
dc.publisherUniversidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.publisher.branchUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotáspa
dc.publisher.facultyFacultad de Ciencias Económicasspa
dc.publisher.placeBogotá, Colombiaspa
dc.publisher.programBogotá - Ciencias Económicas - Maestría en Ciencias Económicasspa
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dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa
dc.rights.licenseAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacionalspa
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/spa
dc.subject.lembCompetitioneng
dc.subject.lembCompetencia industrialspa
dc.subject.lembInterindustry competitioneng
dc.subject.lembCompetencia comercialspa
dc.subject.lembCompetencia económicaspa
dc.subject.lembCompetitioneng
dc.subject.proposalLey de competenciaspa
dc.subject.proposalAnálisis económico del derechospa
dc.subject.proposalCartelspa
dc.subject.proposalCarteles empresarialesspa
dc.subject.proposalCompetition laweng
dc.subject.proposalEconomic analysis of laweng
dc.subject.proposalBusiness cartelseng
dc.subject.proposalLey 1340 de 2009spa
dc.subject.proposalLaw 1340 of 2009eng
dc.titleAnálisis económico del régimen de competencia en Colombiaspa
dc.title.translatedEconomic analysis of the competition regime in Colombiaeng
dc.typeTrabajo de grado - Maestríaspa
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdccspa
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aaspa
dc.type.contentTextspa
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisspa
dc.type.redcolhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TMspa
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentEstudiantesspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentInvestigadoresspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentMaestrosspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentMedios de comunicaciónspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentPúblico generalspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentResponsables políticosspa
oaire.accessrightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2spa

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