Intencionalidad Original, Auto-Constitución y Reflexividad: Un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra auto-transformación

dc.contributor.advisorCussins, Adrian
dc.contributor.authorBurgos Arevalo, Jorge Alexander
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-29T14:49:18Z
dc.date.available2024-07-29T14:49:18Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractEl fenómeno de la intencionalidad original adquiere gran interés e importancia debido a que está directamente relacionado con problemas prácticos sobre cómo debemos actuar, pensar, sentir, percibir, etc., a los cuales nos vemos enfrentados en la vida diaria. El presente proyecto es un análisis sobre la intencionalidad original y consiste en, primero, argüir que la pregunta acerca de cómo es posible el fenómeno de la intencionalidad original genera una indagación sobre la fuente y autoridad de los criterios normativos que guían y justifican los fenómenos intencionales. Segundo, que tal indagación nos lleva a estudiar el fenómeno intrínsecamente relacionado, este es, el fenómeno de la autonomía, y a examinar varias de sus características centrales y particularidades (mediante una investigación lógico-normativa trascendental y estudios empíricos). Y tercero, que las particularidades de la estructura lógico-normativa (metafísica) que hacen posible el fenómeno de la autonomía tiene consecuencias importantes para una teoría del conocimiento, la agencia, el auto-conocimiento y la autoconstitución, desde donde podremos entender y dar una lectura sobre: (i) la crisis existencial actual de la humanidad y, en virtud de ello, (ii) comprender la importancia de nuestra auto-transformación o autoconstitución profunda mediante un tipo particular de compromiso, este es; el compromiso existencial o auténtico. Y así el presente proyecto es un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra autotransformación o intencionalidad original genuina, y su importancia y 5 premura debido a la crisis existencial a la que nos vemos enfrentados actualmente como humanidad (Texto tomado de la fuente).spa
dc.description.abstractThe phenomenon of original intentionality is of great interest and importance because it is directly related to practical problems of how we should act, think, feel, perceive, etc., which we face in our daily lives. The present project is an analysis of original intentionality and consists of, first, arguing that the question of how the phenomenon of original intentionality is possible generates an inquiry into the source and authority of the normative criteria that guide and justify intentional phenomena. Second, that such an inquiry leads us to study the intrinsically related phenomenon, that is, the phenomenon of autonomy, and to examine several of its central characteristics and particularities (through transcendental normative-logical research and empirical studies). And third, that the particularities of the logicalnormative (metaphysical) structure that make the phenomenon of autonomy possible have important consequences for a theory of knowledge, agency, self-knowledge and self-constitution, from which we will be able to understand and give a reading on: (i) the current existential crisis of humanity and, by virtue of it, (ii) understand the importance of our self-transformation or deep self-constitution through a particular type of commitment, that is; the existential or authentic commitment. And so the present project is an analysis of the conditions of possibility of our self-transformation or genuine original intentionality, and its importance and urgency due to the existential crisis that we are currently facing as humanity.eng
dc.description.degreelevelDoctoradospa
dc.description.degreenameDoctor en Filosofíaspa
dc.format.extent306 páginasspa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.identifier.instnameUniversidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.identifier.reponameRepositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.identifier.repourlhttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/spa
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/86635
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisherUniversidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.publisher.branchUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotáspa
dc.publisher.facultyFacultad de Ciencias Humanasspa
dc.publisher.placeBogotá, Colombiaspa
dc.publisher.programBogotá - Ciencias Humanas - Doctorado en Filosofíaspa
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dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa
dc.rights.licenseAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacionalspa
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/spa
dc.subject.ddc110 - Metafísicaspa
dc.subject.ddc160 - Lógicaspa
dc.subject.ddc120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidadspa
dc.subject.ddc100 - Filosofía y Psicologíaspa
dc.subject.ddc170 - Ética (Filosofía moral)spa
dc.subject.ddc190 - Filosofía moderna occidentalspa
dc.subject.lembINTENCIONALIDAD (FILOSOFIA)spa
dc.subject.lembIntentionality (Philosophy)eng
dc.subject.lembAutonomy (Psychology)eng
dc.subject.lembAUTONOMIA (PSICOLOGIA)spa
dc.subject.lembFILOSOFIA DE LA MENTEspa
dc.subject.lembPhilosophy of mindeng
dc.subject.lembTEORIA DEL CONOCIMIENTOspa
dc.subject.lembKnowledge, Theory ofeng
dc.subject.proposalIntencionalidad originalspa
dc.subject.proposalNormatividadspa
dc.subject.proposalAutonomíaspa
dc.subject.proposalAuto-constituciónspa
dc.subject.proposalAuto-transformaciónspa
dc.subject.proposalOriginal intentionalityeng
dc.subject.proposalNormativityeng
dc.subject.proposalAutonomyeng
dc.subject.proposalSelfconstitutioneng
dc.subject.proposalSelf-transformationeng
dc.titleIntencionalidad Original, Auto-Constitución y Reflexividad: Un análisis sobre las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestra auto-transformaciónspa
dc.title.translatedOriginal Intentionality, Self-Constitution and Reflexivity: An analysis of the conditions of possibility of our self-transformationeng
dc.typeTrabajo de grado - Doctoradospa
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06spa
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aaspa
dc.type.contentTextspa
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisspa
dc.type.redcolhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TDspa
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentInvestigadoresspa
oaire.accessrightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2spa

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