Deterioro ambiental: entre las desigualdades económicas y políticas. Un enfoque experimental

dc.contributor.advisorMantilla, Césarspa
dc.contributor.advisorBogliacino, Francescospa
dc.contributor.authorNiño Eslava, Danielspa
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-26T15:31:40Zspa
dc.date.available2021-02-26T15:31:40Zspa
dc.date.issued2021-02-02spa
dc.description.abstractLa relación entre desigualdad y presión ambiental ha sido abordada desde dos mecanismos: consumo de los hogares y elección de políticas ambientales. La presente tesis se propone contribuir a la literatura abordando el estudio de la desigualdad política en conjunto con la desigualdad económica y sus efectos sobre las decisiones socio-ambientales. Se propone un experimento de laboratorio en el que los participantes deben tomar decisiones sobre cuánto extraer de un bien público y decisiones en las cuales deben escoger de manera colectiva una cuota máxima de extracción. Se introducen tratamientos con desigualdad en el poder político, al variar la influencia de los participantes en que resulte elegida su preferencia de cuota máxima. Se estudian los casos en los que el poder político este asociado a los ricos, a los pobres y a los de ingreso medio. De acuerdo a los resultados de los pilotos, se encuentra un efecto negativo sobre las preferencias de políticas ambientales solo en el caso en el que el poder político esté asociado a los ricos. Además, se identifica que quien posee el poder político aumenta sus decisiones de extracción.spa
dc.description.abstractThere are two mechanismsto study the relationship between inequality and environmental damage: household consumption and the choice of environmental policies. This thesis intends to contribute to the literature addressing the study of the effects of political inequality in conjunction with economic inequality. A laboratory experiment is proposed in which participants must make decisions about how much to extract from a public good and decisions in which they must collectively choose a binding extraction level. We introduced treatments with political inequality. These treatments vary the influence of the participants for choosing their binding extraction level preferred. We are interested in the cases in which political power is associated with the rich, the poor, and the middle class. According to the results of the pilots, a negative effect on environmental policy preferences is found only in the case in which political power is associated with the rich. Besides, it is identified that whoever possesses political power increases their extraction decisions.spa
dc.description.degreelevelMaestríaspa
dc.format.extent1 recurso en línea (113 páginas)spa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/79315
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisher.branchUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotáspa
dc.publisher.departmentEscuela de Economíaspa
dc.publisher.programBogotá - Ciencias Económicas - Maestría en Ciencias Económicasspa
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dc.rightsDerechos reservados - Universidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa
dc.rights.licenseAtribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacionalspa
dc.rights.spaAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/spa
dc.subject.ddc330 - Economía::333 - Economía de la tierra y de la energíaspa
dc.subject.proposalPolitical inequalityeng
dc.subject.proposalDesigualdad económicaspa
dc.subject.proposalEconomic inequalityeng
dc.subject.proposalDesigualdad políticaspa
dc.subject.proposalMedio ambientespa
dc.subject.proposalEnvironmenteng
dc.subject.proposalExperimenteng
dc.subject.proposalExperimentospa
dc.subject.proposalBienes públicosspa
dc.subject.proposalPublic goodseng
dc.subject.proposalVotaciónspa
dc.subject.proposalInstitutional choiceeng
dc.subject.proposalElección institucionalspa
dc.titleDeterioro ambiental: entre las desigualdades económicas y políticas. Un enfoque experimentalspa
dc.typeTrabajo de grado - Maestríaspa
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdccspa
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aaspa
dc.type.contentTextspa
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisspa
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionspa
oaire.accessrightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2spa

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