Un cuerpo fuera del cuerpo: sentido de propiedad, procesamiento predictivo y el yo ecológico

dc.contributor.advisorCussins, Adrianspa
dc.contributor.authorGonzalez Cañón, Sergio Estebanspa
dc.date.accessioned2025-10-21T19:25:50Z
dc.date.available2025-10-21T19:25:50Z
dc.date.issued2025
dc.descriptionilustraciones, diagramas, fotografíasspa
dc.description.abstractEsta tesis examina la posibilidad de vivir un cuerpo radicalmente distinto al cuerpo humano y sus repercusiones en la experiencia del yo. Inspirada en experiencias chamánicas de transformación animal y en la idea spinoziana según la cual el cuerpo existe tal como lo sentimos, la investigación aborda cómo el cuerpo se constituye en la mente y cómo este proceso puede reorientarse hacia la vivencia de un cuerpo otro. Se propone que semejante transformación implica un cambio cualitativo en el sentido del yo, dando lugar a un “yo ecológico” abierto a la otredad del mundo natural. El trabajo integra perspectivas de la fenomenología, la psicopatología y la teoría del procesamiento predictivo para explicar la plasticidad del cuerpo vivido y su extensión a cuerpos virtuales. Se presentan evidencias y casos experimentales de morfologías no humanas (aves, mamíferos, artrópodos), argumentando que la interacción activa de un cuerpo situado en el mundo, en lugar de un programa cerebral fijo, es el fundamento de la experiencia corporal y del sentido fundamental del yo. La investigación abre un campo de reflexión filosófica sobre las posibilidades de la mente cuando se rompe su continuidad experiencial con el cuerpo humano. (Texto tomado de la fuente).spa
dc.description.abstractThis thesis examines the possibility of inhabiting a body radically different from the human body and its repercussions on the experience of the self. Inspired by shamanic experiences of animal transformation and by the Spinozian idea that the body exists as we feel it, the research addresses how the body is constituted in the mind and how this process can be reoriented toward the experience of another body. It proposes that such a transformation entails a qualitative change in the sense of self, giving rise to an “ecological self” open to the otherness of the natural world. This work integrates perspectives from phenomenology, psychopathology, and predictive processing theory to explain the plasticity of the lived body and its extension to virtual bodies. It presents evidence and experimental cases of non-human morphologies (birds, mammals, arthropods), arguing that the active interaction of a body situated in the world—rather than a fixed cerebral program—is the foundation of both bodily experience and the fundamental sense of self. The research opens a field of philosophical reflection on the possibilities of the mind when its experiential continuity with the human body is broken.eng
dc.description.degreelevelMaestríaspa
dc.description.degreenameMagíster en Filosofíaspa
dc.description.researchareaFenomenología, filosofía de la mente y ciencias cognitivasspa
dc.format.extent186 páginasspa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.instnameUniversidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.identifier.reponameRepositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.identifier.repourlhttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/spa
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/89050
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.publisher.branchUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotáspa
dc.publisher.facultyFacultad de Ciencias Humanasspa
dc.publisher.placeBogotá, Colombiaspa
dc.publisher.programBogotá - Ciencias Humanas - Maestría en Filosofía
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dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.licenseReconocimiento 4.0 Internacional
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject.ddc120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad::126 - El yospa
dc.subject.ddc120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad::128 - Humanidadspa
dc.subject.proposalSentido de propiedadspa
dc.subject.proposalProcesamiento predictivospa
dc.subject.proposalYospa
dc.subject.proposalSense of ownershipeng
dc.subject.proposalPredictive processingeng
dc.subject.proposalSelfeng
dc.subject.unescoIdentidad culturalspa
dc.subject.unescoCultural identityeng
dc.subject.unescoInteracción socialspa
dc.subject.unescoSocial interactioneng
dc.subject.unescoEcología humanaspa
dc.subject.unescoHuman ecologyeng
dc.titleUn cuerpo fuera del cuerpo: sentido de propiedad, procesamiento predictivo y el yo ecológicospa
dc.title.translatedA body outside the body: sense of ownsership, predictive processing and the ecological selfeng
dc.typeTrabajo de grado - Maestríaspa
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
dc.type.contentText
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
dc.type.redcolhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TM
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentPúblico generalspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentEstudiantesspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentInvestigadoresspa
oaire.accessrightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2

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