Dilemas morales, lamentación y racionalidad
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Monsalve Medina, Luisa
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En esta tesis me propuse establecer que la existencia de dilemas morales no es una circunstancia que comprometa la racionalidad práctica. Para ello tuve que tomar distancia en primer lugar, de las posiciones racionalistas, y desarrollar una concepción de racionalidad, según la cual, el conflicto en los dilemas morales, no tiene por qué ser asimilado a inconsistencias lógicas como en la racionalidad teórica; y en segundo lugar, desarrollar una concepción de la deliberación, según la cual, la deliberación del agente en una situación disyuntiva como los dilemas, es inseparable de la lamentación como residuo moral, y por consiguiente de una consideración pluralista de las fuentes del valor. Hacer caso omiso de estas consideraciones es desconocer y minimizar la naturaleza fenomenológica de la experiencia moral y de la racionalidad práctica.
Abstract. In this thesis I decided to establish the existence of moral dilemmas is not a circumstance that compromised the rationality. So I had to take away in the first place, of the Rationalist position, and develop a concept of rationality, according to which, the conflict in moral dilemmas, does not have why be assimilated to logical as in theoretical rationality inconsistencies; and secondly, developing a conception of the deliberation, according to which, the deliberation of the agent in a disjunctive process of dilemmas, is inseparable from the lamentation as moral residue, and therefore of a pluralistic consideration of the sources of value. Ignoring these considerations is to ignore the phenomenological nature of moral experience and practical rationality.
Abstract. In this thesis I decided to establish the existence of moral dilemmas is not a circumstance that compromised the rationality. So I had to take away in the first place, of the Rationalist position, and develop a concept of rationality, according to which, the conflict in moral dilemmas, does not have why be assimilated to logical as in theoretical rationality inconsistencies; and secondly, developing a conception of the deliberation, according to which, the deliberation of the agent in a disjunctive process of dilemmas, is inseparable from the lamentation as moral residue, and therefore of a pluralistic consideration of the sources of value. Ignoring these considerations is to ignore the phenomenological nature of moral experience and practical rationality.