Incidencia económica de la asignación inicial de derechos de propiedad en la internalización de las externalidades ambientales: el caso del agua

Abstract

En presencia de externalidades ambientales el mercado es incapaz de alcanzar un nivel óptimo social. Por esto, las agendas políticas a todo nivel están incluyendo el tema, especialmente en lo relacionado con el agua y los conflictos por su uso entre los usuarios que habitan las cuencas hidrográficas. El esquema de Pago por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) se viene promoviendo como el instrumento para lograr un uso eficiente de este recurso, incluso algunos autores se aventuran a afirmar que este instrumento permitirá también aliviar la pobreza rural. Este trabajo propone un modelo conceptual que facilita la puesta en práctica del PSA a través de reducir los costos de transacción mediante la incorporación de herramientas desarrolladas por varias disciplinas. Igualmente se ilustra la aplicación del modelo por medio de algunos estudios de caso. Finalmente se rebate la lógica implícita en la literatura sobre PSA acerca de la propiedad de los derechos de los servicios ambientales, y se analizan sus efectos sobre la pobreza rural. / Abstract: In the presence of environmental externalities the market cannot reach Pareto optimum. Thus, political agendas at all levels now include these externalities, especially with regard to water and conflicts over its use between users inhabiting river basins. Payment for Environmental Services (PES) schemes are promoted as an instrument for achieving an efficient use of this resource, and some authors even go as far as to affirm that this tool will enable the alleviation of rural poverty. The present paper proposes a conceptual model which facilitates the implementation of PES through reducing transaction costs, using tools developed in other disciplines. The application of this model is illustrated by case studies. Finally, the implicit logic in current literature on PES concerning the property rights of environmental services is refuted, and the effects of the assignation of these rights on rural poverty are analyzed.

Abstract: In the presence of environmental externalities the market cannot reach Pareto optimum. Thus, political agendas at all levels now include these externalities, especially with regard to water and conflicts over its use between users inhabiting river basins. Payment for Environmental Services (PES) schemes are promoted as an instrument for achieving an efficient use of this resource, and some authors even go as far as to affirm that this tool will enable the alleviation of rural poverty. The present paper prop oses a conceptual model which facilitates the implementation of PES through reducing transaction costs, using tools developed in other disciplines. The application of this model is illustrated by case studies. Finally, the implicit logic in current literat ure on PES concerning the property rights of environmental services is refuted, and the effects of the assignation of these rights on rural poverty are analyzed.