Fisicalismo de-construido: exclusión, generalización y niveles de realidad
dc.contributor.advisor | Morales Otero, Juan Diego | spa |
dc.contributor.advisor | Duica Cuervo, William Augusto | spa |
dc.contributor.author | Ramírez Motoa, Camilo | spa |
dc.contributor.cvlac | https://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0001632000 | spa |
dc.contributor.googlescholar | https://scholar.google.es/citations?user=FmbyXmYAAAAJ&hl=es | spa |
dc.contributor.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9260-6274 | spa |
dc.contributor.researchgate | https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Camilo-Ramirez-Motoa | spa |
dc.contributor.scopus | https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=57203877990 | spa |
dc.date.accessioned | 2025-07-30T00:26:39Z | |
dc.date.available | 2025-07-30T00:26:39Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2025-07-29 | |
dc.description | ilustraciones, diagramas | spa |
dc.description.abstract | Las críticas de Isabel de Bohemia a Descartes en torno a la posibilidad de interacción causal inter-sustancial contribuyó decididamente al ocaso del dualismo ontológico cartesiano e inauguró una ruta argumentativa que recalcaba la íntima relación metafísica de dependencia o determinación entre propiedades físicas y mentales y que desembocaría, eventualmente, en una forma de monismo ontológico siendo el fisicalismo una de sus formulaciones más sofisticadas. Sin embargo, el problema de la causación mental en este marco metafísico persiste debido a la exclusión causal de las propiedades mentales por las propiedades base o determinadoras. Incluso, el problema de la generalización termina por mostrar que este tipo de exclusión se extiende a cualquier tipo de relaciones causales que involucren propiedades distintas a las propiedades físicas. Este panorama termina por trastocar la comprensión de nosotros mismos como agentes racionales sensibles a estados mentales y la relación de las ciencias especiales con ciencias como la física fundamental. Esta investigación examina un elemento crítico en el desarrollo del problema de la exclusión causal y generalización: el modelo de niveles de realidad y las relaciones metafísicas de determinación/dependencia entre propiedades físicas/no-físicas; indicando que ambos dependen de las constricciones que dicho modelo impone. Posteriormente, se evaluarán dos maneras de articular un fisicalismo que deje de lado la idea de niveles de realidad: un fisicalismo de hacedores de verdad y un fisicalismo estructuralista. Por último, se argumentará que la versión estructuralista es preferible en la medida que satisface distintos criterios de evaluación y selección teórica. (Texto tomado de la fuente). | spa |
dc.description.abstract | Isabel de Bohemia's criticisms of Descartes concerning the possibility of causal inter-substantial interaction contributed decisively to the decline of Cartesian ontological dualism, inaugurating an argumentative route that stressed the intimate metaphysical relation of dependence or determination between physical and mental properties that eventually lead to a form of ontological monism, physicalism being one of its most sophisticated formulations. However, the problem of mental causation in this metaphysical framework persists due to the causal exclusion of mental properties given base or determining properties. In fact, the problem of generalization ends up showing that this type of exclusion extends to any type of causal relations involving properties other than physical properties. This picture ends up disrupting the understanding of ourselves as rational agents sensitive to mental states and the relation of the special sciences and sciences such as fundamental physics. This investigation examines a critical element in the articulation of the problem of causal exclusion and generalization: the model of levels of reality and the metaphysical relations of determination/dependence between physical and non-physical properties. It will be pointed out that these depend on the constraints that such a model imposes. Subsequently, two ways of articulating a physicalism that sets aside the idea of levels of reality will be evaluated: a truth-maker physicalism and a structuralist physicalism. Finally, it will be argued that the structuralist version is preferable insofar as it satisfies different criteria of theoretical evaluation and selection. | eng |
dc.description.degreelevel | Doctorado | spa |
dc.description.degreename | Doctor en Filosofía | spa |
dc.description.researcharea | Fenomenología, filosofía de la mente y filosofía del lenguaje | spa |
dc.format.extent | xii, 270 páginas | spa |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | spa |
dc.identifier.instname | Universidad Nacional de Colombia | spa |
dc.identifier.reponame | Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombia | spa |
dc.identifier.repourl | https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/ | spa |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/88396 | |
dc.language.iso | spa | spa |
dc.publisher | Universidad Nacional de Colombia | spa |
dc.publisher.branch | Universidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá | spa |
dc.publisher.department | Departamento de Filosofía | spa |
dc.publisher.faculty | Facultad de Ciencias Humanas | spa |
dc.publisher.place | Bogotá, Colombia | spa |
dc.publisher.program | Bogotá - Ciencias Humanas - Doctorado en Filosofía | spa |
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dc.rights.accessrights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | spa |
dc.rights.license | Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional | spa |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | spa |
dc.subject.ddc | 110 - Metafísica::111 - Ontología | spa |
dc.subject.ddc | 120 - Epistemología, causalidad, humanidad::122 - Causalidad | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Causación mental | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Estructuralismo | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Fisicalismo | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Niveles de realidad | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Hacedores de verdad | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Perspectivismo | spa |
dc.subject.proposal | Levels of reality | eng |
dc.subject.proposal | Mental causation | eng |
dc.subject.proposal | Perspectivism | eng |
dc.subject.proposal | Physicalism | eng |
dc.subject.proposal | Structuralism | eng |
dc.subject.proposal | Truthmakers | eng |
dc.subject.unesco | Causa y efecto | spa |
dc.subject.unesco | Cause and effect | eng |
dc.subject.unesco | Ontología | spa |
dc.subject.unesco | Ontology | eng |
dc.subject.unesco | Determinismo | spa |
dc.subject.unesco | Determinism | eng |
dc.subject.unesco | Estructuralismo | spa |
dc.subject.unesco | Structuralism | eng |
dc.title | Fisicalismo de-construido: exclusión, generalización y niveles de realidad | spa |
dc.title.translated | Physicalism de-constructed: exclusion, generalization and levels of reality | eng |
dc.type | Trabajo de grado - Doctorado | spa |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06 | spa |
dc.type.coarversion | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | spa |
dc.type.content | Text | spa |
dc.type.driver | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis | spa |
dc.type.redcol | http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TD | spa |
dc.type.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | spa |
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopment | Estudiantes | spa |
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopment | Investigadores | spa |
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopment | Público general | spa |
oaire.accessrights | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | spa |
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