Rigorismo e integridad : un ensayo sobre la concepción del yo dividido en la filosofía práctica kantiana

dc.contributor.advisorUribe Botero, Ángelaspa
dc.contributor.authorGonzález Valderrama, José Leonardospa
dc.contributor.researchgroupRelativismo y racionalidadspa
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-29T17:39:38Zspa
dc.date.available2021-01-29T17:39:38Zspa
dc.date.issued2020-05-26spa
dc.description.abstractLa filosofía moral kantiana se ha asociado usualmente al rigorismo moral. Según esta posición, los deberes morales deben ser cumplidos incondicionalmente. Por ejemplo, afirma Kant, debemos cumplir el deber moral de la veracidad incluso ante un asesino que nos pregunte por el paradero de alguien que se refugia en nuestra casa. El objetivo de esta investigación es realizar una crítica al rigorismo moral kantiano. Para ello he dividido el texto en tres partes. En la primera parte presento las posición de Kant sobre la mentira (capítulo 1) y tras analizar el procedimiento del imperativo categórico explico en qué sentido este autor está comprometido con el rigorismo moral (capítulo 2). En la segunda parte, muestro que el rigorismo moral está fundamentado en el modelo de la agencia del yo dividido. Según este modelo, la agencia es un ejercicio de control por parte de un yo racional que debe controlar o someter a la parte pasiva no racional (capítulo 3). Siguiendo el trabajo de Bernard Williams, muestro que este modelo agencial conduce al problema de la integridad personal, pues en ocasiones la moralidad nos exige actuar en contra de nuestro carácter y de aquello que configura nuestra integridad (capítulo 4). En la tercera parte, examino la respuesta de Christine Korsgaard al problema de la integridad. Esta autora rechaza la concepción del yo dividido, y en cambio propone el modelo constitucional. Según este modelo, ser agente solo es posible cuando este está constituido como un todo integrado, y solo es posible estar integrado si existe un compromiso con la moralidad. De esta manera, ella puede articular una respuesta al problema de la integridad sin abandonar lo que denomino “la tesis de la prioridad normativa de la moralidad” (capítulo 5). En contra de esta posición, y siguiendo a Josep Corbí, articulo una crítica al modelo constitucional mostrando que este todavía está comprometido con la concepción del yo dividido (capítulo 6.1). Corbí también realiza una crítica a la tesis de la prioridad normativa de la moralidad (6.2 y 6.3). Al final concluyo que la filosofía moral kantiana, ya sea en su versión clásica o en la versión contemporánea de Korsgaard, no puede responder al problema de la integridad personal, en la medida en que desestima injustificadamente el valor normativo de fenómenos prácticos no morales.spa
dc.description.abstractKantian moral philosophy has usually been associated with moral rigorism. According to this position, moral duties must be fulfilled unconditionally. Kant claims that we must fulfill the moral duty of truthfulness even in the face of a murderer who asks us about the whereabouts of someone who takes refuge in our house. The aim of this investigation is to make a criticism of Kantian moral rigorism. To this purpose, I have divided the text in three parts. In the first part, I present Kant's position on lying (chapter 1), and after analyzing the procedure of categorical imperative I explain in which sense this author is committed to moral rigorism (chapter 2). In the second part, I show that moral rigorism is based on the conception of the divided self. According to this model, agency is an exercise of control by a rational self that must control the non-rational passive part (chapter 3). Following to Bernard Williams, I show that this model leads to the problem of personal integrity, since sometimes morality requires us to act against our character and against that which configures our integrity (chapter 4). In the third part, I examine Christine Korsgaard's response to the problem of integrity . She rejects the model of the divided self and proposes instead the constitutional model. According to this model, being an agent is only possible when it is constituted as an integrated whole, and it is only possible to be integrated if there is a commitment to morality. In this way, she can articulate a response to the problem of integrity without abandoning what I call “the thesis of the normative priority of morality” (chapter 5). Contrary to this position, and following Josep Corbí, I show that the constitutional model is still committed to the conception of the divided self (chapter 6.1). In addition, I also make a critique of the thesis of the normative priority of morality (6.2 and 6.3). I conclude that Kantian moral philosophy , whether in its classical version or in Korsgaard's contemporary version, cannot respond to the problem of personal integrity because it unjustifiably disregards the normative value of practical non-moral phenomena.spa
dc.description.additionalLínea de investigación: Ética.spa
dc.description.degreelevelDoctoradospa
dc.description.projectDilemas morales y agencia. Una lectura a partir de Kantspa
dc.description.sponsorshipCOLCIENCIASspa
dc.format.extent259spa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.identifier.citationGonzález Valderrama, J. L. (2020). Rigorismo e integridad : un ensayo sobre la concepción del yo dividido en la filosofía práctica kantiana [Tesis de doctorado, Universidad Nacional de Colombia]. Repositorio Institucional.spa
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/78995
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisher.branchUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotáspa
dc.publisher.departmentDepartamento de Filosofíaspa
dc.publisher.programBogotá - Ciencias Humanas - Doctorado en Filosofíaspa
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dc.rightsDerechos reservados - Universidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa
dc.rights.licenseAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacionalspa
dc.rights.spaAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/spa
dc.subject.ddc170 - Ética (Filosofía moral)spa
dc.subject.ddc100 - Filosofía y Psicologíaspa
dc.subject.proposalKantspa
dc.subject.proposalKanteng
dc.subject.proposalChristine Korsgaardspa
dc.subject.proposalChristine Korsgaardeng
dc.subject.proposalBernard Williamsspa
dc.subject.proposalBernard Williamseng
dc.subject.proposalIntegridad personalspa
dc.subject.proposalPersonal integrityeng
dc.subject.proposalRigorismo moralspa
dc.subject.proposalMoral rigorismeng
dc.titleRigorismo e integridad : un ensayo sobre la concepción del yo dividido en la filosofía práctica kantianaspa
dc.typeTrabajo de grado - Doctoradospa
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06spa
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aaspa
dc.type.contentTextspa
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisspa
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionspa
oaire.accessrightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2spa

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