Efectos de la comunicación en el desacuerdo de expectativas: evidencia empírica para Colombia

dc.contributor.advisorJunca Rodríguez, Gustavo Adolfo
dc.contributor.advisorGalvis Ciro, Juan Camilo
dc.contributor.authorAnzoategui Zapata, Juan Camilo
dc.contributor.cvlacAnzoategui Zapata, Juan Camilo [https://scienti.minciencias.gov.co/cvlac/EnRecursoHumano/inicio.do]spa
dc.contributor.googlescholarAnzoategui Zapata, Juan Camilo [https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=cZlNjVEAAAAJ&hl=es]spa
dc.contributor.orcidAnzoategui Zapata, Juan Camilo [0000-0001-6680-275X]spa
dc.contributor.researchgateAnzoategui Zapata, Juan Camilo [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Juan-Camilo-Anzoategui-Zapata]spa
dc.coverage.countryColombia
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-13T21:54:54Z
dc.date.available2022-12-13T21:54:54Z
dc.date.issued2022-12-15
dc.descriptionilustraciones, diagramasspa
dc.description.abstractEsta tesis busca identificar los efectos de la comunicación de la política económica sobre las expectativas macroeconómicas. En particular, busca identificar los efectos de la comunicación de política monetaria y fiscal sobre los desacuerdos en las expectativas de inflación del consumidor, las expectativas del déficit fiscal del mercado financiero y las expectativas de la tasa de interés de política monetaria. Para ello son construidos indicadores de desacuerdos en las expectativas, indicadores de comunicación monetaria y fiscal, así como también indicadores de credibilidad y reputación de política monetaria y fiscal. La metodología empleada consiste en evaluar los efectos de la comunicación a través de estimaciones OLS-HAC, GMM-HAC, GMM-WINDMEIJER y VAR (impulso-respuesta y descomposición de varianza). Los resultados econométricos de la investigación indican que la comunicación monetaria y fiscal ejerce efectos importantes en la formación de expectativas macroeconómicas. Por lo tanto, la principal recomendación de política económica apunta a que las instituciones monetaria y fiscal deben realizar mayores para que la comunicación se convierte en una herramienta importante de política económica que permita la conducción de las expectativas macroeconómicas y como resultado facilite la conquista de los metas perseguidas por las autoridades económicas. (Texto tomado de la fuente)spa
dc.description.abstractThis thesis seeks to identify the effects of economic policy communication on macroeconomic expectations. In particular, it seeks to identify the effects of monetary and fiscal policy communication on disagreements in consumer inflation expectations, financial market fiscal deficit expectations, and monetary policy interest rate expectations. For this, indicators of disagreements in expectations, indicators of monetary and fiscal communication, as well as indicators of credibility and reputation of monetary and fiscal policy are constructed. The methodology used consists of evaluating the effects of communication through OLS-HAC, GMM-HAC, GMM-WINDMEIJER and VAR (impulse-response and variance decomposition) estimates. The econometric results of the research indicate that monetary and fiscal communication exerts important effects on the formation of macroeconomic expectations. Therefore, the main economic policy recommendation is that the monetary and fiscal institutions must do more so that communication becomes an important economic policy tool that allows the management of macroeconomic expectations and, as a result, facilitates the conquest of goals pursued by the economic authorities.eng
dc.description.degreelevelDoctoradospa
dc.description.degreenameDoctor en Ciencias Económicasspa
dc.format.extent128 páginasspa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.identifier.instnameUniversidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.identifier.reponameRepositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.identifier.repourlhttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/spa
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/82863
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisherUniversidad Nacional de Colombiaspa
dc.publisher.branchUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotáspa
dc.publisher.facultyFacultad de Ciencias Económicasspa
dc.publisher.placeBogotá, Colombiaspa
dc.publisher.programBogotá - Ciencias Económicas - Doctorado en Ciencias Económicasspa
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dc.relation.referencesZumpano, L., Johnson, K., & Anderson, R. (2003). “Internet use and real estate brokerage market intermediation.” Journal of Housing Economics, 12 (2), 134–150.spa
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa
dc.rights.licenseReconocimiento 4.0 Internacionalspa
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/spa
dc.subject.ddc330 - Economía::339 - Macroeconomía y temas relacionadosspa
dc.subject.ddc330 - Economía::332 - Economía financieraspa
dc.subject.ddc330 - Economía::336 - Finanzas públicasspa
dc.subject.lembContent analysis (communication)eng
dc.subject.lembAnálisis de contenido (comunicación)spa
dc.subject.proposaldesacuerdosspa
dc.subject.proposalcomunicaciónspa
dc.subject.proposalexpectativasspa
dc.subject.proposalpolítica monetariaspa
dc.subject.proposalpolítica fiscalspa
dc.subject.proposalexpectativas fiscalesspa
dc.subject.proposaldisagreementseng
dc.subject.proposalcommunicationeng
dc.subject.proposalexpectationseng
dc.subject.proposalmonetary policyeng
dc.subject.proposalfiscal policyeng
dc.subject.proposalfiscal expectationseng
dc.subject.proposalconsumidoresspa
dc.subject.proposalconsumerseng
dc.titleEfectos de la comunicación en el desacuerdo de expectativas: evidencia empírica para Colombiaspa
dc.title.translatedCommunication effects on the disagreement of expectations: empirical evidence for Colombiaeng
dc.typeTrabajo de grado - Doctoradospa
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06spa
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aaspa
dc.type.contentTextspa
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisspa
dc.type.redcolhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TDspa
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentEstudiantesspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentInvestigadoresspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentMaestrosspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentMedios de comunicaciónspa
dcterms.audience.professionaldevelopmentResponsables políticosspa
oaire.accessrightshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2spa

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