Las razones detrás de la condena moral del suicidio. Una investigación empírica
| dc.contributor.advisor | Rosas López, Alejandro | spa |
| dc.contributor.author | Ramírez Sierra, Diego Fernando | spa |
| dc.contributor.researchgroup | Ética, Comportamiento y Evolución | spa |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-01-28T18:16:13Z | spa |
| dc.date.available | 2021-01-28T18:16:13Z | spa |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-11-17 | spa |
| dc.description.abstract | Is moral judgment a consequence of deliberate and conscious reasoning, or is it intuitive and automatic? Recent research into Moral Psychology has sought to collect evidence to support the intuitionist position. The discussion in this field has attempted to establish whether moral assessment is monist and harm-centered, or pluralistic (i.e., built on other moral concerns). This study first inquiries about the reasons why suicide is considered wrong (i.e., because of purity and/or harm concerns); second, if the conditions of suicide could affect moral judgment; and third, if the label “tainting the soul”, previously used in Rottman et al. (2014), adequately collects concerns triggering suicide’s moralization under the purity domain. Through two empirical studies, it was found that suicide can be considered wrong under purity and harm concerns (mostly of purity); additionally, suicide is assessed to be more wrong when there is no evident cause of this, or if the suicide is survived by dependents, and less wrong when it is consequence of a tragic life. Finally, the Tainting the Soul label does not fully collect reasons promoting the moralization of suicide under the purity domain. Furthermore, this research made clear a significant effect of the Sacred Value dimension regardless of participants’ political position. Overall, these findings suggest that when people moralize this behavior under purity concerns, they are likely to understand that suicide violates a sacred value (i.e., the value of life). | spa |
| dc.description.abstract | ¿Es el juicio moral resultado de un razonamiento deliberado y consciente, o de un razonamiento intuitivo y automático? Investigaciones recientes en el campo de la psicología moral han buscado ofrecer evidencia a favor de una postura intuicionista del juicio moral. La discusión, en este campo, ha procurado establecer si el juicio moral es monista y centrado en el daño, o se construye a partir de un número variado de preocupaciones morales. El presente estudio indagó, primero, por las razones que soportan la moralización del suicidio (i.e., pureza y/o daño); segundo, si las condiciones personales, familiares o sociales del suicida podían afectar el juicio moral; y, tercero, si el descriptor Manchar el Alma usado en un estudio previo (Rottman et al., 2014) recoge de manera adecuada las preocupaciones que detonan la moralización de esta conducta bajo el dominio de la pureza. A través de dos estudios empíricos se encontró que el suicidio puede ser moralizado a partir de preocupaciones de pureza y de daño (mayoritariamente de pureza). Adicionalmente, que el suicidio puede ser objeto de mayor reproche cuando no existe causa aparente del mismo o le sobreviven al suicida personas que dependen de su ayuda; o visto de manera menos severa cuando es resultado de una vida trágica. Finalmente, que la expresión Manchar el Alma no recoge de manera completa las razones que promueven la moralización del suicidio bajo el dominio de la pureza. El estudio evidenció un efecto significativo de la dimensión Valor Sagrado, independientemente de la posición política de los participantes. Esto sugiere que cuando las personas moralizan esta conducta bajo preocupaciones de pureza muy probablemente están entendiendo que el suicidio viola un valor sagrado (i.e., el valor de la vida). | spa |
| dc.description.additional | Línea de Investigación: Filosofía Moral, Psicología Cognitiva y Moral | spa |
| dc.description.degreelevel | Maestría | spa |
| dc.format.extent | 90 | spa |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | spa |
| dc.identifier.citation | (APA) Ramírez Sierra, D. F. (2020). Las razones detrás de la condena moral del suicidio. Una investigación empírica. (Tesis de Maestría). Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia. | spa |
| dc.identifier.citation | (CHICAGO) Ramírez Sierra, Diego Fernando. “Las Razones Detrás de La Condena Moral Del Suicidio. Una Investigación Empírica.” Tesis de Maestría. Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2020. | spa |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/78968 | |
| dc.language.iso | spa | spa |
| dc.publisher.branch | Universidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá | spa |
| dc.publisher.department | Departamento de Filosofía | spa |
| dc.publisher.program | Bogotá - Ciencias Humanas - Maestría en Filosofía | spa |
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| dc.rights | Derechos reservados - Universidad Nacional de Colombia | spa |
| dc.rights.accessrights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | spa |
| dc.rights.license | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional | spa |
| dc.rights.spa | Acceso abierto | spa |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | spa |
| dc.subject.ddc | 170 - Ética (Filosofía moral) | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Filosofía Moral | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Moral Philosophy | eng |
| dc.subject.proposal | Fundamentos Morales | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Moral Domains | eng |
| dc.subject.proposal | Daño | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Harm | eng |
| dc.subject.proposal | Purity | eng |
| dc.subject.proposal | Pureza | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Valor Sagrado | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Sacred Valued | eng |
| dc.subject.proposal | Tainting the Soul | eng |
| dc.subject.proposal | Manchar el Alma | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Suicidio | spa |
| dc.subject.proposal | Suicide | eng |
| dc.title | Las razones detrás de la condena moral del suicidio. Una investigación empírica | spa |
| dc.title.alternative | Reasons behind the moral condemnation of suicide. An empirical research | spa |
| dc.type | Trabajo de grado - Maestría | spa |
| dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdcc | spa |
| dc.type.coarversion | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | spa |
| dc.type.content | Text | spa |
| dc.type.driver | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis | spa |
| dc.type.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | spa |
| oaire.accessrights | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | spa |

