‘Un golpe en la cabeza’: los aspectos irracionales del pensamiento
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Cortés Hurtado, Carlos Mario
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Trabajo de grado - Maestría
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EspañolFecha de publicación
2013
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El pensamiento, en cuanto fenómeno del mundo natural, tiene dos aspectos: uno racional, otro irracional. El aspecto racional se refiere a las relaciones inferenciales que constituyen sus distintos objetos dado que ellos deben ser entendidos como actitudes proposicionales, es decir, estados psicológicos caracterizados en virtud de la actitud que puede atribuírseles hacia la verdad de una oración. El aspecto irracional del pensamiento se refiere a los avatares causales que determinan el comportamiento humano complejo. A través de un análisis de la naturalización quineana de la epistemología y de los intentos por racionalizar la metáfora, se mostrará que es fácil confundir el aspecto racional con el aspecto irracional. La semántica de Donald Davidson será el marco teórico que permitirá mostrar cómo poner ambos aspectos en su lugar.
Abstract. Thought, as a phenomenon of the natural world, has two aspects: one rational, the other irrational. The rational aspect concerns the inferential relations that constitute the various objects of thought since they must be understood as propositional attitudes, i.e., psychological states characterized under the attitude to be attributed to the truth of a sentence. The irrational aspect of thought refers to the causal vicissitudes that determine the complex human behavior. Through an analysis of Quine's naturalization of epistemology and of attempts to rationalize metaphor, it is shown that it is easy to confuse the rational aspect with the irrational aspect. The semantics of Donald Davidson serve as the theoretical framework that will allow to put both aspects in its place.
Abstract. Thought, as a phenomenon of the natural world, has two aspects: one rational, the other irrational. The rational aspect concerns the inferential relations that constitute the various objects of thought since they must be understood as propositional attitudes, i.e., psychological states characterized under the attitude to be attributed to the truth of a sentence. The irrational aspect of thought refers to the causal vicissitudes that determine the complex human behavior. Through an analysis of Quine's naturalization of epistemology and of attempts to rationalize metaphor, it is shown that it is easy to confuse the rational aspect with the irrational aspect. The semantics of Donald Davidson serve as the theoretical framework that will allow to put both aspects in its place.
Abstract
Palabras clave
Pensamiento ; Racionalidad ; Causalidad ; Epistemología ; Semántica ; Metáfora ; Thinking ; Rationality ; Causality ; Epistemology ; Semantics ; Metaphor