Responsabilidad de las acciones acráticas. Un análisis desde la voluntariedad en Ética Nicomaquea III y VII.
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Rojas Galván, Daniela Lorena
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Este trabajo busca mostrar que las acciones acráticas son voluntarias porque cumplen con el requerimiento epistemológico de la voluntariedad. Las acciones acráticas, aunque se realizan paralelamente a la elección que realiza el agente, al producir una prohaíresis, cumplen con el requerimiento de conocer los particulares de la acción. Además, son acciones que de ninguna manera cuentan como forzosas. Por lo que se afirma que las acciones acráticas son voluntarias. Se aborda el problema del ácrata que no delibera, para mostrar que incluso en este tipo de agente, que actúa de manera acrática pero no elige, se cumple también con los requisitos de la voluntariedad.
Abstract: This work aims to show that acratic actions are voluntary because they satisfy the epistemological criterion for voluntariness. Acratic actions, although are made contrary to the choice that the agent does, when producing a prohairesis, satisfy with the requirement of knowing the particulars relevant for action. Besides, acratic actions are not in any way forced. Thus, acratic actions are voluntary. It is also tackled the question of the acratic that does not deliberate, to show that even in this kind of agent, the one that acts acratically but does not produce a choice, the criteria for voluntariness are fulfilled.
Abstract: This work aims to show that acratic actions are voluntary because they satisfy the epistemological criterion for voluntariness. Acratic actions, although are made contrary to the choice that the agent does, when producing a prohairesis, satisfy with the requirement of knowing the particulars relevant for action. Besides, acratic actions are not in any way forced. Thus, acratic actions are voluntary. It is also tackled the question of the acratic that does not deliberate, to show that even in this kind of agent, the one that acts acratically but does not produce a choice, the criteria for voluntariness are fulfilled.