Non cooperative stackelberg network formation.
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C. Larrosa, Juan M.
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2014-08-31
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Non-cooperative network formation games in industrial organizations analyzehow firms create links. We assume that links portray cost-reducing informationand that access to this information is not reciprocal. We study the consequences interms of profits if one firm can move first in establishing a link. A classic modelof exogenous Stackelberg leadership is developed and first-mover advantage isobserved.
Non-cooperative network formation games in industrial organizations analyzehow firms create links. We assume that links portray cost-reducing informationand that access to this information is not reciprocal. We study the consequences interms of profits if one firm can move first in establishing a link. A classic modelof exogenous Stackelberg leadership is developed and first-mover advantage isobserved.
Non-cooperative network formation games in industrial organizations analyzehow firms create links. We assume that links portray cost-reducing informationand that access to this information is not reciprocal. We study the consequences interms of profits if one firm can move first in establishing a link. A classic modelof exogenous Stackelberg leadership is developed and first-mover advantage isobserved.