Contenido y normatividad: una evaluación del alcance de la representación no-proposicional
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Se defiende la necesidad de entender la experiencia perceptual, la acción intencional y el conocimiento como restricciones que operan de forma simultánea sobre la teoría de la representación, bajo el supuesto de que la construcción representacional de estos fenómenos abre una ruta para explicar la forma en que están unificados en una persona. En este marco se defiende la existencia de motivaciones fenomenológicas y psicológicas para una construcción no-proposicional de la representación en la experiencia perceptual y en la acción intencional. A partir de este resultado y de la integración, a nivel del contenido, entre los tres fenómenos mencionados, se sugiere como campo de desarrollo la redefinición de la noción de conocimiento, de una forma que permita involucrar, como base para la relación epistémica con el entorno, formas no-conceptuales de representación.
Perceptual experience, intentional action and knowledge are presented as necessary restrictions on the theory of representation, under the assumption that a representational understanding of those phenomena opens a pathway to explain how they are unified in a person. Within this framework, phenomenological and psychological motivations are presented for a non-conceptual understanding of representation in both perceptual experience and intentional action. From this result and the idea of integration, at the level of content, among the three phenomena mentioned, it is suggested that we should consider, as a field of philosophical development, the redefinition of the notion of knowledge, in a way that allow us to involve non-conceptual forms of representation as basis for epistemic relations with the environment.
Perceptual experience, intentional action and knowledge are presented as necessary restrictions on the theory of representation, under the assumption that a representational understanding of those phenomena opens a pathway to explain how they are unified in a person. Within this framework, phenomenological and psychological motivations are presented for a non-conceptual understanding of representation in both perceptual experience and intentional action. From this result and the idea of integration, at the level of content, among the three phenomena mentioned, it is suggested that we should consider, as a field of philosophical development, the redefinition of the notion of knowledge, in a way that allow us to involve non-conceptual forms of representation as basis for epistemic relations with the environment.