Libertad y las distintas concepciones de la responsabilidad moral
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Arango Soler, Luis Alfredo
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Trabajo de grado - Pregrado
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EspañolFecha de publicación
2015-06-22
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En esta tesis discuto la responsabilidad moral, un fenómeno perteneciente al campo interdisciplinario de la psicología moral. En una primera instancia, introduzco uno de los presupuestos fundamentales de la responsabilidad moral, la libertad. Expongo varios sentidos en que el concepto de libertad puede ser entendido, para determinar de forma precisa aquel que es presupuesto de la responsabilidad moral. Tras haber identificado el sentido de libertad relevante para la responsabilidad moral, expongo un tradicional debate filosófico alrededor de estos conceptos, conocido como el debate compatibilismo-incompatibilismo. Posteriormente, explico las teorías de la responsabilidad moral y muestro cómo ellas al hacer énfasis en la psicología de los agentes se ven más prometedoras en la solución del debate compatibilismo-incompatibilismo.
Abstract: In this monograph I discuss moral responsibility, a phenomenon widely discussed in the interdisciplinary field of moral psychology. In the first instance, I introduce one of the fundamental prerequisites of moral responsibility: freedom. I present several ways of understanding the concept of freedom in order to determine precisely the one that it is a condition of moral responsibility. Once identified the sense of freedom relevant for moral responsibility, I expound a traditional philosophical debate about freedom and moral responsibility, known as the compatibilism-incompatibilism debate. Afterwards, I explain the theories of moral responsibility and show how by emphasizing the psychology of agents they look more promising in solving the compatibilism-incompatibilism puzzle.
Abstract: In this monograph I discuss moral responsibility, a phenomenon widely discussed in the interdisciplinary field of moral psychology. In the first instance, I introduce one of the fundamental prerequisites of moral responsibility: freedom. I present several ways of understanding the concept of freedom in order to determine precisely the one that it is a condition of moral responsibility. Once identified the sense of freedom relevant for moral responsibility, I expound a traditional philosophical debate about freedom and moral responsibility, known as the compatibilism-incompatibilism debate. Afterwards, I explain the theories of moral responsibility and show how by emphasizing the psychology of agents they look more promising in solving the compatibilism-incompatibilism puzzle.