Embodied Soul and Ensouled Body: Moral Self in Galen’s Account of Soul and Body
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Novoa Lara, Jazmín Andrea
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Quod animi mores (QAM) se identifica a menudo con una defensa materialista y determinista de la sustancia del alma y su relación con el cuerpo. De acuerdo con esta identificación, la discusión académica contemporánea sobre la psicología moral de Galeno limita en cierta medida las conclusiones de QAM a la negación de toda responsabilidad moral y agencia personal. En la presente disertación, argumento que tales posiciones malinterpretan el interés de Galeno en la naturaleza moral de los seres humanos en tanto substancialmente corporizados (embodied) y animados (ensouled). Propongo, entonces, estudiar las tesis de Galeno con un énfasis en los análisis epistemológicos, ontológicos y éticos de su aproximación a la naturaleza humana y planteo la noción de sí mismo (self) como una posibilidad conceptual que nos permite entender la articulación entre concepciones de causalidad distintas y contradictorias, así como entre explicaciones distintas y complementarias, respecto a los fenómenos psicológicos y fisiológicos.
Quod animi mores (QAM) is frequently read as a materialist and determinist defence of the substance of the soul and its relation to the body. Among contemporary scholarly discussions on Galen's moral psychology, the outcomes of QAM are also framed by this reading, which entails somehow a denial of any account of moral responsibility and personal agency. In this dissertation, I argue that those interpretations misunderstand Galen’s interest in the moral nature of human beings as substantially ensouled and embodied, so I propose understanding Galen’s thesis with a focus on the epistemological, ontological, and ethical analysis involved in his approach to human nature. I address the notion of self as a conceptual possibility that allows us to understand the articulations between different and conflicting accounts of causation as well as between different and complementary kinds of explanations regarding physiological and psychological phenomena.
Quod animi mores (QAM) is frequently read as a materialist and determinist defence of the substance of the soul and its relation to the body. Among contemporary scholarly discussions on Galen's moral psychology, the outcomes of QAM are also framed by this reading, which entails somehow a denial of any account of moral responsibility and personal agency. In this dissertation, I argue that those interpretations misunderstand Galen’s interest in the moral nature of human beings as substantially ensouled and embodied, so I propose understanding Galen’s thesis with a focus on the epistemological, ontological, and ethical analysis involved in his approach to human nature. I address the notion of self as a conceptual possibility that allows us to understand the articulations between different and conflicting accounts of causation as well as between different and complementary kinds of explanations regarding physiological and psychological phenomena.