Skepsis y la relación consigo mismo en el filosofar de Nietzsche
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Autores
Villamil Lozano, Harol David
Director
Meléndez Acuña, Germán Arturo
Tipo de contenido
Trabajo de grado - Doctorado
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EspañolFecha de publicación
2020
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Abstract
This thesis presents six essays that reveal the connection between Nietzsche’s concern for the relationship with oneself and the type of Skepsis defended in Beyond Good and Evil (section “We scholars”) and in The Anti-Christ (§54). The first essay exposes Nietzsche’s interest in the philosophers’ personality and the way to access to that personality through a proper reading of their philosophical systems. The second essay introduces the notions of “I” and the “oneself” to show how dogmatic philosophies implies an unhealthy relationship in the human being. The third essay shows that on the pathway to get liberation and to be cured of dogmatism, the spirit goes through various types of illness and health states. The fourth essay interprets the section “We scholars” of Beyond Good and Evil. It shows the difference between the weak Skepsis (that is an expression of a weak will) and the stronger type of Skepsis (typical of the future philosopher who lives in constant experimentation). The fifth essay interprets §54 of The Anti-Christ. It concludes that the weak human being is dependent on beliefs, which are forms of self-alienation. At the same time, the great spirit, whose great passion uses convictions as a medium to her own goals, is necessarily sceptical. The last essay compares “We scholars” of Beyond Good and Evil and §54 of The AntiChrist. It identifies the shared features of the Skepsis that appears in both works. Finally, it proposes an interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy. This interpretation characterizes Nietzsche as a constant experiment to do no falling ill with dogmatism and to be master of himself and his virtues.