Compromiso y simpatía: emotividad en la toma de decisiones cooperativas en redes estocásticas de siguiente generación
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Latorre Ochoa, Julian Felipe
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Los resultados empíricos en las ciencias sociales muestran que los tomadores de decisiones no siempre toman decisiones racionales y el concepto de racionalidad limitada [68] se usa para explicar dicho comportamiento. En este documento se utiliza esta idea y junto a las categorías de compromiso y simpatía provistas por Amartya Sen en su critica al homo economicus [61, 62, 60, 59], se ha diseñado una aplicación especifica para la conformación de conjuntos cooperativos a través de un proceso coalicionista en el tiempo que, se espera, brinde al diseño de sistemas complejos descentralizados, entre ellos al diseño de redes ad hoc, soluciones superiores a las provistas por el sólo equilibrio de Nash.
Abstract: The empirical results in the social sciences show that decision makers do not always make rational decisions and the concept of limited rationality [68] is used to explain such beha- vior. In this document, this idea is used, and together with the categories of commitment and sympathy provided by Amartya Sen in his criticism of homo economicus [61, 62, 60, 59], a specific application has been designed for the conformation of cooperative groups through a coalition process in time that is expected to provide to the design of complex decentralized systems, as ad hoc networks, superior solutions to those provided by the only Nash equili- brium
Abstract: The empirical results in the social sciences show that decision makers do not always make rational decisions and the concept of limited rationality [68] is used to explain such beha- vior. In this document, this idea is used, and together with the categories of commitment and sympathy provided by Amartya Sen in his criticism of homo economicus [61, 62, 60, 59], a specific application has been designed for the conformation of cooperative groups through a coalition process in time that is expected to provide to the design of complex decentralized systems, as ad hoc networks, superior solutions to those provided by the only Nash equili- brium